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ARTICLE
THE GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST APPROACH
TO CHOICE OF LAW: AN ANALYSIS
AND A REFORMULATION

Robert A. Sedler*
INTRODUCTION

The governmental interest approach formulated by the late
Brainerd Currie' has been the catalyst of the modern "revolution"
in choice of law in this country. 2 This revolution has resulted in the
widespread abandonment of the rigid, territorially based rules of the
original Restatement3 in favor of a view of choice of law that
emphasizes considerations of policy and fairness to the parties.4
Virtually all modern approaches to choice of law recognize the
relevancy of the policies and interests of the involved states;5 the
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University.
I. Currie's major articles have been collected in B. CURRIE, SELECTED EsSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) [hereinafter cited as CURRIE]. Two other

articles published subsequently are Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 754 (1963); Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments:A
Role for Congress, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 89 [hereinafter cited as Currie, Full Faith
and Credit]. The basic elements of Currie's approach are summarized in R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 221-24 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as CRAMPTON, CURRIE & KAY].

2. As Professor John P. Dawson put it, when presenting Currie with the first
Order of the Coif Triennial Award, "It seems clear that after Brainerd Currie, that
dark science called the conflict of laws can never be the same." TIME, Jan. 8, 1965,
at 42-43.
3. Some courts, however, have refused to join the "revolution." See CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY, supra note 1, at 247-48; Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus
Choice of Law Rules: JudicialMethod in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REV.
-, , n.2 (1977) (currently awaiting publication) [hereinafter cited as Sedler, Rules
of Choice of Law].
4. For a discussion of the meaning of the policy-centered approach, see
Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky; JudicialMethod and the Policy-Centered
Conflict of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27, 57-61 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Sedler, Babcock
v. Johnson in Kentucky]. While I consider the basic structure of the RESTATEMENT
SECOND to represent a "rules approach" rather than a policy-centered one, id. at
61-63, there is a "policy component" to that approach, which, in practice, may
have turned it into a "flabby amorphous product." See note 58 infra.
5. Professor Ehrenzweig's "proper law in a proper forum" approach is
based on considerations of policy, but Ehrenzweig denies the relevance of "state
interests." His approach is summarized in CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY, supra note 1,
at 306, and was the subject of a symposium in 18 OKLA. L. REV. 233-375 (1975),
which includes a restatement of the approach by Ehrenzweig. Ehrenzweig, A
ProperLaw in a ProperForum:A "Restatement" of the "Lex ForiApproach," 18
OKLA. L. REV. 340 (1965).
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disagreement is over how much weight they are to be given in
comparison with other considerations, 6 and over whether the resolution of conflicts problems should proceed case by case, as would
follow from Currie's approach, or on the basis of narrow, policybased rules. 7
Currie's approach with its insistence that choice of law decisions be made solely with reference to the policies reflected in the
laws of the involved states and the interest of each state, in light of
those policies, in having its law applied on the point in issue, was
attacked at the time it was formulated, 8 and continues to be attacked
by commentators today. 9 Yet, as this Article will demonstrate,
Currie's approach is, in fact, usually applied today by courts committed to a policy-centered view of choice of law, even when they
are purporting to apply a different approach' 0 and even though
Currie's formulation was not designed for use in the process of
deciding actual cases.' 1 Currie's approach was developed from an
academic perspective, 1 2 and the methodology was designed to enable students and legal scholars to analyze conflicts problems in
their entirety. Further, it was developed against the background of
the rules approach of the original Restatement as a basic alternative
to that methodology.' 3 Finally, Currie's tragically early death prevented further refinement of his approach, and particularly precluded his response to the choice of law revolution that was just
beginning when he died. 4
For all of these reasons, it now appears appropriate to analyze,
reformulate and, in a sense, simplify Currie's methodology for use
by the courts in the process of deciding actual cases. The Article
6. This appears particularly in regard to Leflar's choice-influencing considerations and Trautman and Von Mehren's functional analysis. See note 219
infra.
7. See notes 166-80 & accompanying text infra (discussion of narrow policybased rules).
8. See, e.g., Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply
to Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 463 (1960); Kegel, The Crisisof Conflict of
Laws, 112 RECUEIL DES COURS, 91, 180-89 (1964); Rheinstein, How to Review a
Festschrift, II AM. J. CoMP. L. 632, 632-68 (1962).
9. See, e.g., Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
548, 557-61 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Reese, Chief Judge Fuld]; Reese, Choice of
Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315, 316-19 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Reese, Rules or Approach].
10. See notes 278-87 & accompanying text infra.
11. The Verdict of Quiescent Years, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 585-86 (article

originally published at 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 258 (1%1)).
12. Id. at 585.
13. If some of Currie's writing seems ponderous today, and if it seems that
often he is "stating the obvious," this is only because the battle has long since been
won, completely in academic circles, and to a large extent in the courts. This was
not so, of course, at the time that Currie wrote.
14. Currie died in 1%5. The "revolution" is generally considered to have
begun with Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743

(1963).
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will begin by summarizing the theory of Currie's approach and the
methodology which he formulated for its application. It will then
discuss and respond to the criticisms that have been directed against
interest analysis. In this context, other basic approaches to choice of
law, specifically the approaches of territorialism and of narrow,
policy-based rules, will be examined. Criticisms of Currie's resolution of the "true conflict" 15 will then be discussed. The concluding
portion of the Article will be devoted to the reformulation of
Currie's methodology.
I.

CURRIE'S GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST APPROACH:
UNDERLYING THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

The underlying theory of Currie's governmental interest approach is that choice of law problems should be resolved by a
consideration of first, the policies behind the laws of the involved
states, and second, the interest of each state, in light of those
policies, in having its law applied on the particular issue as to which
the laws differ.' 6 The factual contacts 7 that the parties and the
transaction have with the various states do not have independent
significance, and are relevant only insofar as those contacts give
rise to a governmental interest in having a particular rule of substantive law applied on a particular issue.8
The methodology of interest analysis first directs scrutiny of
the content of the differing laws of the forum and of the other state
or states whose law is potentially applicable.' 9 The content of each
state's law will reflect a policy. The second determination, then, is
whether, in light of the policy reflected in that law, the state has an
interest in having its law applied on the point in issue. 20 Currie
15. See notes 48-52 & accompanying text infra.
16. It also proceeds on the assumption that the basic law is the law of the
forum. See generally On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, in CURRIE,
supra note 1, at 3 (article originally published at 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964 (1958)).
17. A factual contact may be defined as a contact involving the substantive
claim, e.g., in an accident case, the accident itself or the point of origin of the trip
that resulted in the accident.
18. Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at
727-28 (article originally published at 1963 DUKE L.J. i). Currie demonstrates the
difference between interest analysis and the "grouping of contacts" approach of
the Restatement Second by a discussion of Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175
N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1%1). Id. at 728-36.
19. They will be referred to as the other involved states. We will generally use
the two-state example, because this is what usually occurs in practice. A state's law
is potentially applicable for conflicts purposes whenever one of the parties resides
there or whenever some of the legally significant facts occurred there.
20. The methodology is summarized in Notes on Methods and Objectives in
the Conflict of Laws, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 183-84 (article originally published
at 1959 DUKE L.J. 171), and in CRAMTON, CURRIE, & KAY, supra note l, at 221-24.
It should be noted that the interest referred to is the interest of the state in having its law applied in the kind of situation that is before the court. Where special
circumstances are present in the actual case that ordinarily are not present in that
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illustrated the application of interest analysis by a detailed consideration of the problem of married women's contract immunity
involved in Milliken v. Pratt,2' and the problem of survival of
actions presented by Grant v. McAuliffe. 22 While fuller consideration of these cases will be left for later discussion, 23 a review

of Currie's method of determining preliminarily the existence or
non-existence of a governmental interest should be helpful at this

juncture.
In Milliken, a Massachusetts married woman entered into a
contract with a Maine creditor in Maine, 24 by which she agreed to
stand surety for the debt of her husband. The contract was valid in
Maine, but would have been void in Massachusetts by reason of that

state's statute protecting married women from liability on such
contracts. In analyzing the policies and interests of the involved
states, Currie first asked whom Massachusetts was intending to
protect when it chose to subordinate its general policy of enforcing
contracts to a specific policy of shielding married women from

liability on surety contracts for the debts of their husbands. 25 Since

the Massachusetts legislature would not presume to decide whether

married women from Maine or any other state needed such protection, the women with whose welfare it was concerned were obviously Massachusetts married women. 26 Thus, Massachusetts had an

interest in applying its law to implement its protective policy for the
kind of situation, the interest is still deemed to exist for purposes of Currie's
interest analysis.
For example, Currie sees the state where an accident occurred as having an
interest in allowing a non-resident injured there to recover, because in the absence
of such recovery, the non-resident might be unable to pay medical and hospital bills
owed to resident creditors or might become a public charge. This interest is deemed
to be present in every case where a non-resident is injured in the forum, and it
would not matter in the particular case that the non-resident was immediately
removed to a hospital in his home state. The Constitution and the Choice of Law:
Governmental Interests and the JudicialFunction, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 205,
366-75 (article originally published at 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (1958)).
21. 125 Mass. 374 (1878). See generally Married Women's Contracts: A Study
in Conflict-of-Laws Method, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 77 (article originally
published at 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958)).
22. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). See generally Survival of Actions:
Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, in CURRIE, supra note 1,
at 128 (article originally published at 10 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958)).
23. See notes 38-52 & accompanying text infra.
24. Under the "place of contracting" rule the contract was considered to be
made in Maine because the "last act," i.e., the giving of the credit in reliance on the
guaranty, occurred there. However, the factual contacts with Maine were such as
to justify the conclusion that the contract was "centered" there.
25. For a discussion of "domestic subordination," see The Verdict of Quiescent Years, in CURRIE, supra note I, at 610 (article originally published at 28 U.
CHI. L. REV. 258 (1961)).

26. Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, in
CURRIE, supra note i, at 85-86 (article originally published at 25 U.CHI. L. REV. 227
(1958)).
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benefit of a Massachusetts married woman irrespective of where the
creditor resided or where the contract was made.2 7 Maine's policy,
on the other hand, was to promote security of transactions, and
Maine had an interest in applying that policy for the benefit of the
Maine creditor. Thus, in Milliken each involved state had an interest in applying its law in order to implement the policy reflected by
that law.
In Grant v. McAuliffe,28 a California victim and a California
tortfeasor were involved in an Arizona accident in which the tortfeasor died. Under California law, the cause of action survived the
death of the tortfeasor; under Arizona law it did not. The policy
behind the California rule obviously was to protect the victim and to
prefer the victim's interest over the interest of the tortfeasor's
estate. 2 9 As Currie put it: "California has an interest in the application of its law and policy whenever the injured person is one toward
whom California has a governmental responsibility." 3 ° This interest
would extend to a California plaintiff injured in Arizona. In discussing the Arizona rule of non-survival of actions, Currie emphasizes
the need to determine a rational policy. He deemed legislative
motivation-inertia or response to the pressures of the insurance
lobby, for example-irrelevant in determining a state's policy for
purposes of interest analysis: 3' "The business of courts in conflictof-law cases is not to judge the policies of the states, but to ascertain
them and give them effect, so far as possible, when there is a
legitimate basis for effectuating them.''32 Currie found the most
rational policy basis for the Arizona rule to be that the "living
should not be mulcted for the wrongs of the dead." 3 3 Another
possible policy would be protecting the decedent's insurer from
liability whenever the insured died in the accident. 3 In any event
the policy behind the Arizona law protects those interested in the
estate of the decedent and, we will assume, insurers of Arizona
drivers. Since the deceased was a California domiciliary,35 and the
27. Id. at 86-87.
28. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
29. Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of

Laws, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 143 (article originally published at 10 STAN. L.
REV. 205 (1958)).

30. Id. at 144.
31. Legislative motivation generally is irrelevant in other contexts. See, e.g.,
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
32. Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of
Laws, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 144 (article originally published at 10 STAN. L.
REV. 205 (1958)).

33. Id.
34. Id. at 160.
35. Since the deceased's heirs would be claiming on the basis of his status as a
California domiciliary, it would not matter where the heirs themselves were
domiciled.
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automobile was insured in California,36 the policy reflected in
37
Arizona law would not be advanced by its application in this case.
Thus, only California has an interest in applying its law.
The preliminary determination of the policies and interests of
the involved states leads to a particular case's falling into one of
four "interest situations": (1) the false conflict, (2) the apparent
conflict, (3) the true conflict, and (4) the unprovided-for case. Each

will be defined and discussed separately.
A.

The False Conflict

When a consideration of the policies and interests of the
involved states leads to the conclusion that one state has an interest

in having its law applied on the point in issue while the other state
does not, the false conflict is presented.38 In such a situation Currie

advocates application of the law of the only interested state. 3 9 The
false conflict appears most frequently in accident cases such as

Grant v. McAuliffe, where two parties from a recovery state are
involved in an accident in a non-recovery state. In such cases, the
policy of the recovery state will be advanced by the application of
its law, while the non-recovery state generally will have no interest
in applying its law. It is here that the place of the wrong rule of the

traditional approach 4° produces a clearly unsound result, since it
requires the application of the law of the state that has no interest in
having its law applied to the detriment of the interest of the state that

does. And it was in such a case42 that the revolution in choice
of law began. This breakthrough has resulted in the widespread
abandonment of the traditional approach in favor of "modern

36. For insurance purposes, the vehicle is considered insured in the state
where it is garaged, and the insurer is considered a "resident" of this state for the
purpose of determining a state's interest in protecting the insurer.
37. Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of
Laws, in CURRIE, supra note I, at 145, 160 (article originally published at 10 STAN.
L. REV. 205 (1958)).
38. The term, "false conflict," has been used by other writers to describe
different situations, such as where the substantive laws of the involved states do
not differ, or where, although they do, the same result would be reached under
either law. See Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 74, 75-78 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as False Conflicts). As now Professor Westen observed there,
"To the extent that a finding of false conflicts is a product of governmental interest
analysis, it is both improper and misleading to divorce that finding from the process
which creates it." Id. at 79.
39. "If the court finds that one state has an interest in the application of its
policy in the circumstances of the case and the other has none, it should apply the
law of the only interested state." CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY, supra note i, at 222.
40. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).

41. See, e.g., White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966). To avoid such
a result in Grant v. McAuliffe, the court resorted to manipulative techniques to
bring about the application of California law. See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really
Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657, 670 n.35 (1959).
42. See note 14 supra.
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solutions." 4 3 Most commentators and courts agree with Currie on
resolution of the false conflict: It should be resolved by applying the
law of the only interested state, 44 whether the interested state is the
forum or another state."
B.

The Apparent Conflict

When Currie looked to the interests of the involved states, his
initial inquiry was directed to whether each state had a possible or
hypothetical interest: Might the policy behind a state's law be
advanced if it were applied on the point in issue? If each state had a
possible interest, the case presented an apparent conflict. In such a
situation Currie said that the court should reexamine the respective
policies and interests of the involved states and ask whether a more
moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or interests of
one of the states could avoid the conflict.' As he put it, "There is
room for restraint and enlightenment in the determination of what
state policy is and where state interests lie. 4 7 If the court concludes
43. In the guest statute situation, see, e.g., Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259
(Ky. 1967); Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966); Clark v.
Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226,229 A.2d
625 (1967); Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966); Woodward v.
Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 957 (1968); Wilcox v.
Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965). In the situation involving other
immunities, see, e.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968); Baits v.
Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86,
193 A.2d 439 (1963); Brown v. Church of the Holy Name of Jesus, 105 RI. 322, 252
A.2d 176 (1969). For a listing of all of the states that have abandoned the traditional
approach, see Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 3, at -, n.2.
44. See, e.g., D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 30-32 (1965); R.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 201-03 (1971) (Professor
Weintraub uses the term "spurious conflict"); Baxter, Choice of Law and the
Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4-8 (1963); Horowitz, The Choice of Law in
California-A Restatement, 21 UCLA L. REV. 719, 723, 729-47 (1974); Traynor,
Conflict of Laws: ProfessorCurrie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF.
L. REV. 845, 847-51 (1961); Von Mehren, Book Review, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 91, 92
(1964).
45. As to the application of the law of the only interested state by the
"disinterested" forum, see, e.g., Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, 357 F.2d 581
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562,447 P.2d 254 (1968); Reich v.
Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Fuller v. Greenup, 267
Cal. App. 2d 10, 72 Cal. Rptr. 531 (2d Dist. 1968). But see Schlitz v. Meyer, 29 Ohio
St. 2d 184, 280 N.E.2d 925 (1972), where in a suit between two Kentucky residents
who were involved in an accident in Ohio, the Ohio court held that it was required
to apply the legislative policy represented in the Ohio guest statute to any accident
that occurred in that state. In accident cases, the practice of the courts is summarized by the following rule of choice of law: When two parties from a recovery
state, without regard to forum residence, are involved in an accident in a nonrecovery state, recovery will be allowed. See Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra
note 3, at -.
46. CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY, supra note 1, at 222; Notes on Methods and
Objectives in the Conflict of Law, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 186 (article originally
published at 1959 DUKE L.J. 171).
47. The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, in CURRIE,
supra note 1, at 368 (article originally published at 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1959)). He

UCLA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 25: 181

that a more moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or
interest of one state can avoid the conflict, there is, in effect, a false
conflict, calling for application of the law of the only state found to
have an interest.
C.

The True Conflict
Where a reconsideration of the policies and interests of the
involved states persuades the court that the conflict cannot be
avoided by a more moderate and restrained interpretation of the
policy or interest of one state, the case presents the true conflict.
Such was the situation in Milliken v. Pratt. Massachusetts' policy
of protecting married women from overreaching on the part of their
husbands was implicated, notwithstanding that the contract was
entered into in Maine with a Maine creditor. Likewise, Maine's
policy of promoting security of transactions was implicated, notwithstanding that the defendant was a resident of Massachusetts. In
Currie's words, "Each state has a policy, expressed in its law, and
each state has a legitimate interest, because of its relationship to one
of the parties, in applying its law and policy to the determinationof
48
the case. "
Currie emphasizes that the traditional approach (or for that
matter, any rules approach), would resolve the conflict of interests
by the application of a rule which would be based, in one degree or
another, on the factual contacts the transaction had with the involved states. Apart from his view that factual contacts are simply
not "rational" criteria to resolve a conflict of interests, Currie
objects to any resolution of the true conflict in which the forum
sacrifices its own policy and interest. Whether it does so by the
application of a rule or by an "assessment of the respective values
of the competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states, in
order to determine which is to prevail," 49 a court performing the
judicial function cannot, in Currie's view, prefer the interest of
another state to its own.5' Therefore, in the case of the true conflict,
uses the example of a consideration of the interests of foreign countries in determining the application of the Jones Act to cases involving foreign flag ships.

48. Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, in
CURRIE, supra note 1,at 107-08 (article originally published at 25 U. CHI. L. REV.
227 (1958)). The true conflict would also be presented in Currie's variation of Grant
v. McAuliffe, where an Arizona tortfeasor injured a California plaintiff in California. Id. at 148-49. Whenever a recovery state plaintiff is injured by a non-recovery
state defendant, a true conflict is necessarily presented. Both states are interested

in applying their law on the recovery question, since the consequences of allowing
or denying recovery will be felt in the parties' home states irrespective of where the
accident occurred.
49. Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Law, in CURRIE, supra
note 1, at 182 (article originally published at 1959 DUKE L.J. 171).
50. This, says Currie, "is a political function of a very high order. This is a
function that should not be committed to courts in a democracy." Id. at 182.
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Currie maintains that the forum must advance its own policy and
interest and apply its own law. 5'
Built into Currie's methodology, then, is the premise that the
result may differ depending on where suit is brought, as it clearly
will in the true conflict situation. Such differences are unavoidable,
says Currie; if uniformity is to be achieved and the interest of one
state is to be sacrificed in favor of another, it must be done by
Congress in the exercise of its powers under the full faith and credit
clause.52

D.

The Unprovided-ForCase
Analysis of the policies and interests of the involved states may
lead to the conclusion that neither state has an interest in having its
law applied on the point
in issue. Currie calls this situation the
"unprovided-for case, ' ' 53 unprovided-for because the analysis of
the policies and interests of the involved states does not by itself
lead to a solution. Such cases will arise because, as Currie notes,
"[d]ifferent laws do not necessarily mean conflicting policies,
when it is remembered that the scope of policy is limited by the
legitimate interests of the respective states."'I' He uses as an example of the unprovided-for case a Grant v. McAuliffe variation in
which an Arizona plaintiff is injured in Arizona by a California
defendant. California's policy is to protect accident victims, but it
has no interest in applying this policy in favor of an Arizona
plaintiff injured in Arizona by a California defendant. Arizona's
policy is to protect the estates of deceased tortfeasors and their
insurers; it has no interest in applying that policy in the case of a
California tortfeasor. Thus neither state cares what happens, and it
51. Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, in
supra note 1, at 119-21 (article originally published at 25 U. CHI. L. REV.
227 (1958)).
52. Id. at 125-27, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental
Interests and the Judicial Function, in CURRIE, supra note I, at 193-94 (article
originally published at 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (1958)). He notes that Congress has
exercised its powers under the full faith and credit clause with respect to recognition. of sister state judgments, which is why a state cannot assert a conflicting
interest in opposition to recognition of such a judgment. The Constitutionand the
"Transitory" Cause of Action, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 330-37 (article originally
CURRIE,

published at 73 HARV. L. REV. 36, 268 (1959)).

Currie also discusses the situation of a true conflict brought in a disinterested
third state, e.g., Milliken v. Pratt brought in Vermont, and proposes means for its
resolution. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, supra note I, at 767, 778-80. See
also CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY, supra note 1,at 222. Since such cases are exceedingly rare in practice and are even less likely to occur as a result of the inroads made
into "transient jurisdiction" by Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977), this
interest situation will not be discussed in this Article.
53.

Laws, in

Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of
CURRIE,

supra note 1,at 152 (article originally published at 10 STAN. L.

REV. 205 (1958)).

54. Id. at 153.
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is necessary to go beyond the policies and interests reflected in the
differing laws to decide which law should be applied.

Currie did not fully develop solutions for the unprovided-for

case.5 5 Rather, he discussed it primarily in the context of uncon-

stitutional discrimination, i.e., whether it was unconstitutional for a
state to refuse to extend the benefit of its law to a non-resident

party.56 Not only, however, is Currie's approach bereft of fullydeveloped solutions for this interest situation, but also, as will be
case that has given the courts the
shown, it is the unprovided-for
57
most difficulty in practice.
II.

CRITICISMS OF INTEREST ANALYSIS AS A BASIC APPROACH
AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CHOICE OF LAW

This section discusses and responds to the criticisms that have
been directed against interest analysis as a basic approach to choice
of law. It also discusses what may be called the other basic apapproaches of territorialproaches to choice of law, specifically the
58
ism and of narrow, policy-based rules.
55. He did, however, advance some tentative solutions. Id. at 153-56.
56. In the Grant v. McAuliffe variation, the constitutional question would be
whether, since California would apply its law in favor of a California plaintiff
injured by a California tortfeasor in Arizona, California would be discriminating
unconstitutionally against an Arizona plaintiff in violation of the privileges and
immunities clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, and the equal protection clause, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, if that plaintiff did not also receive the benefit of the California law allowing recovery. See generally UnconstitutionalDiscrimination in the
Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 445
(article originally published at 69 YALE L.J. 1323 (1960)); Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: EqualProtection, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at
526 (article originally published at 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1960)). Currie thought
such unconstitutional discrimination would exist because California has what Currie called an "altruistic interest" in applying its law to allow recovery, and did not
have a subsidiary policy of protecting the estates of deceased tortfeasors. Unconstitutional Discriminationin the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, in
CURRIE, supra note 1, at 489 (article originally published at 69 YALE L.J. 1323
(1960)); UnconstitutionalDiscriminationin the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection,
in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 571-72 (article originally published at 28 U. CHI. L. REV.
1 (1960)). I, however, find it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will be disposed
to find limitations on choice of law inhering in the privileges and immunities and
equal protection clauses. See Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unprovidedfor
Case: Reflections on Neumeier v. Kuehner, I HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 143-49 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Sedler, Interstate Accidents].
57. See note 384 & accompanying text infra.
58. 1 will not be discussing at length the approach of the Restatement Second
in the present article. See generally Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra
note 4, at 61-63; Sedler, The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement (Second): An
Analysis and Critique, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 284-86 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Sedler, Contracts Provisions]. Although the structure of the Restatement Second
emphasizes localization based on factual contacts, the courts are also directed
under § 6 to take into account various policy considerations, including the policies
reflected in the substantive laws of the involved states, and the interest of each
state, in light of those policies, in having its law applied on the point in issue. The
amalgam of "localization and policy," which combines "rules" and "approach,"
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The Criticisms
Lack of Governmental Interest in Private Litigation
The underlying premise of Currie's interest analysis has been
called unsound on the ground that a state is interested only in the
application of its public law-such as criminal, taxation, and social
insurance law-which relates to the power of the state to control
political matters, and not in the application of its private law, which
does not implicate the power of the state." Another commentator
has noted that a conflicts case involving private litigants presents no
''conflict between states in the sense in which states clash on
questions of boundary, treatment of foreign nationals or property, or
spheres of interest.'"6 Thus, in a conflicts case, the court should be
interested in achieving "conflicts justice" 6 between the private
parties and the private interests before it. 62 Further, that states
"desire" to have their law applied, and that the intent of the
lawmaker was "to have [law] apply within the limits of existing or
future choice of law rules," has been called a fictitious concept.63
The response to this line of criticism begins with the observation that interest analysis is not intended to turn conflicts law into a
''public law" matter. The focus of interest analysis is still on the
private parties; it is only that their rights in a conflicts case are
determined with reference to the policies and interests reflected in
the differing laws of the involved states. When the policy behind a
state's law would be advanced, the party who would benefit from
the application of the law is deemed entitled to invoke such benefit
in the choice of law context.
More significantly, while a conflicts case admittedly does not
involve a direct conflict between states in the same manner as a
boundary dispute or a dispute over spheres of interest, a state may
still have a potential stake in the outcome of a controversy between
private persons. 6' Particularly in regard to regulatory and protective
A.
1.

see Reese, Rules or Approach, note 9 supra, may have turned the Restatement
Second into a "flabby, amorphous and sterile product." CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY,
supra note 1, at 307. Those courts that purport to apply the Restatement Second
tend in practice to emphasize the policy aspect over the "rule" aspect, and generally decide the case with reference to the policies and interests of the involved states.
See Sedler, Contracts Provisions, supra at 311-15.

No academic commentator appears to favor retention of the traditional approach, and no useful purpose would be served in rehashing its deficiencies in the
present article.
59. Kegel, supra note 8, at 180-82.
60. Rheinstein, supra note 8, at 664.
61. Conflicts justice refers to achieving a just result in a case containing a
foreign element by applying the law of a particular state. See, e.g., Juenger, Choice
of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 202,208-10 (1969); Kegel, supra note

8, at 184-89.
62. Kegel, supra note 8, at 186.
63. Juenger, supra note 61, at 209.
64. See A. SHAPIRA, THE INTEREST APPROACH TO CHOICE OF LAW 64-66 (1970)
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laws, which are aimed at social engineering, 65 the state may be
relying on the private persons whose interests are affected by those
laws to implement the social engineering policy. 66 In this country,
for example, tort law rather than social insurance still represents the

primary method of providing compensation for accident victims .67
Thus, a state is interested in having its tort law applied to implement

the compensatory policy reflected in that law in the same manner as
it would be interested in applying its social insurance law. 68 As this

example indicates, it is not possible to draw a neat distinction
between "public law" and "private law." Rules of substantive law

are frequently interlocking: Public law has private law elements and
vice versa, so that the public law and private law elements of a rule
of substantive law cannot always be separated. 69 In short, public
law interests are present in a host of questions litigated by private
parties,7" and it is simply inaccurate to say that the state as such has
no interest in the outcome of litigation between private parties.71
2.

No Consideration of Policies Other Than Those Expressed in
Substantive Law Rules
Although this criticism is to some extent directed specifically

[hereinafter cited as SHAPIRA]. For example, the impact that the application of
American maritime or labor law to disputes between seamen and foreign flag ships
could have on the "governmental interests" of the maritime nations was demonstrated by their filing of amicus briefs when cases involving these questions were
before the Supreme Court. See Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress?Reflections on Reading Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TEX. L. REV.
141, 147-49 (1967).
65. See SHAPIRA, supra note 64, at 72-73.
66. As to the vindication of public interests by private litigants in a different
context, see Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
67. This has not been altered by the enactment of no-fault automobile insurance laws in many states because of the generally low threshold limits contained in
those laws.
68. The "social engineering" function is the same irrespective of how the
state goes about achieving it.
69. See generally Riphagen, The Relationship between Public and Private Law
and the Rules of Conflict of Laws, 102 RECUEIL DES COURS 215, 220-21 (1961).
70. See id. at 229-39.
71. As for the argument that the responsibility of a court in a conflicts case is
to achieve "conflicts justice," Currie notes that the ideal of justice under law in the
conflicts situation necessarily involves an ambiguity-justice under what law?
Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in Conflict of Laws, in
CURRIE, supra note 1, at 138 (article originally published at 10 STAN. L. REV. 205
(1958)). The judicial responsibility is to find a rational and just result in the case
before it. The Verdict of Quiescent Years, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 596 (article
originally published at 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 258 (1961)). And as Professor Shapira has
noted, it is contrary to the nature and purpose of the judicial process for the court to
apply or reject rules of law in ignorance of their underlying public interests.
SHAPIRA, supra note 64, at 65. If interest analysis does produce "rational and just
results" in the cases that come before the courts, it must be deemed to satisfy the
concern for "conflicts justice."
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against Currie's proposed resolution of the true conflict, 2 it really
calls into question the basic premise of interest analysis: that the
choice of law decision should be made on the basis of substantive
laws of the involved states. The contention of this line of criticism is
that in the conflicts case significant consideration should be given to
multistate concerns which transcend the policy reflected in a state's
substantive law. The criticism7 3 is best summarized by Professor
Rosenberg's observation that a conflicts case necessitates "coordinating a multistate system, not merely vindicating substantive law
policies. "I
Currie has in effect responded to this criticism as follows:
I have been told that I give insufficient recognition to
governmental policies other than those that are expressed
in specific statutes and rules: the policy of promoting a
general legal order, that of fostering amicable relations
with other states, that of vindicating reasonable expectations, and so on. If this is so, it is not, I hope, because of a
provincial lack of appreciation of the worth of these ideals,
but because of a felt necessity to emphasize the obstacles
that the present system7 5 interposes to any intelligent approach of the problem. Let us first clear away the apparatus that creates false problems and obscures the nature
of the real ones. Only then can we effectively set about
ameliorating the ills that arise from a diversity of laws by
bringing to bear all the resources of jurisprudence,
politics,
76
and humanism-each in its appropriate way.
Under Currie's approach, considerations of policies other than
those reflected in the substantive laws of the involved states do
come into play to the extent that they are related to "restraint and
enlightenment in the determination of what state policy is and where
state interests lie." 7 7 While these considerations are not emphasized
by Currie, neither are they ignored. Currie cautioned that a court
would be "well advised to consider the conflict with foreign interests that may result from a too selfish and provincial determina-

tion, "78 and noted that "the courts of a state may properly take into
72. The criticism is expressed by some commentators who, while favoring
interest analysis generally, disagree with Currie's resolution of the true conflict. See
generally SHAPIRA, note 69 supra; von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law
Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927 (1975) [hereinafter cited as von Mehren,
Recent Trends].
73. Different commentators have formulated these multi-state concerns differently. See SHAPIRA, supra note 69, at 112; Hill, supra note 8, at 489; Kegel,
supra note 8, at 180-82; von Mehren, Recent Trends, supra note 72, at 942 (1975).
74. Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 459,464
(1967).
75. As pointed out previously, Currie was writing against the background of
the traditional approach.
76. Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in CURRIE,
supra note 1, at 186-87 (article originally published at 1959 DUKE L.J. 171).
77. Id. at 186.
78. The Verdict of Quiescent Years, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 592 (article
originally published at 28 U. CHIi. L. REV. 258 (1%1)).
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account the possibility of conflict with the interests of other states in
determining what domestic policy is and how far domestic interests
extend." 79 It is this "restraint and enlightenment" on which Currie
relied to give what he considered to be appropriate recognition to
multistate concerns.
What Currie was not willing to do, however, was sacrifice the
advancement of the forum's interest for the sake of multistate
concerns.80 His sense of priorities appears most clearly in his insistence that the forum must apply its own law in the case of the true
conflict, in the face of a situation in which the criticisms of those
who oppose interest analysis as a basic approach and those who only
oppose Currie's resolution of the true conflict blend. The matter of
consideration of policies other than those expressed in substantive
law rules, therefore, will be discussed more fully in the context of
criticism of Currie's solution to the true conflict. 8' The point to be
emphasized at this juncture is that Currie did not completely ignore
multistate concerns, but subordinated them to a consideration of the
policies and interests reflected in the substantive laws of the
involved states.82

3.

The Difficulty in Determining Policies and Interests

a.

Difficulty in Determining Policy. Probably the major criti-

cism that has been directed against interest analysis is the purported
difficulty in determining the policies behind particular laws and the
interest of a state in having its law applied to implement those
policies. If the critics are to be believed, this difficulty may be
compared with cleaning out the Augean stables or any of the other
labors of Hercules. Professor Reese claims that to determine the
policy behind a law "will often prove an onerous, difficult, and
frustrating task," and that even when this can be done, "it will
often be difficult to refine the policy to the point of being able to
determine whether it would or would not be furthered by the
[substantive] rule's application in a case involving foreign facts.'"3
79. Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and
Immunities, in CURRIE, supra note I, at 498 (article originally published at 69 YALE
L.J. 1323 (1960)).
80. Including, of course, supposed uniformity of result. Married Women's
Contracts: A Study in Conflicts-of-Law Method, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 119
(article originally published at 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958)).
81. See notes 220-24 & accompanying text infra.
82. It has also been contended that Currie failed to take account of cofisiderations of fairness to the parties. Hill, supra note 8, at 474. Fairness to the parties,
however, is an independent choice of law consideration, see notes 233-34 & accompanying text infra, and is built into Currie's governmental interest approach in the
same manner as it is built into any other approach to choice of law. Currie was
indeed concerned with fairness, especially in regard to consensual transactions,
where the parties may have relied on the law of a particular state. See Currie, Full
Faith and Credit, supra note I, at 97-99.
83. Reese, Rules or Approach, supra note 9, at 317.
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He notes that the New York Court of Appeals had been employing
interest analysis, 84 and that, "because of the uncertainty and unpredictability it engendered, the court has been deluged by appeals and
wracked by dissent." 85 There is said to be particular difficulty in
ascertaining the policy behind the law of another state 86 even when
it is possible to ascertain the policy behind the law of the forum.87
Finally, says Professor Reese, interest analysis requires that every
case be decided on an ad hoc basis,88 thus affording the courts
opportunities for "judicial masquerading." As he puts it:
Since there will often be uncertainty as to what policy or
policies are embodied in a statute or judge-made rule, it is
all too easy for a court to decide first on the rule that it
wishes to apply and then to ascribe to that rule a purpose
that makes its application appropriate while ascribing at
the same time to the potentially applicable rules of other
states purposes that would not be furthered by their application.
The best answer to this line of criticism lies in the experience
of the courts in practice, which demonstrates most clearly that it is
not difficult to determine either the policies behind a particular rule
of substantive law or the interest of each of the involved states in
having its law applied on the point at issue. The argument is indeed
undercut completely by the fact that in the non-conflicts situation
the court must frequently identify the policy behind a law in order to
determine whether that policy would be advanced by the law's
application to the facts of a particular case. As Currie points out, the
process is identical in the conflicts and non-conflicts situation: The
court must decide whether the policy behind a particular rule of law
would be advanced by its application in the particular circumstances
presented. 9°
This point may be illustrated by comparing the court's treatment of Bernkrant v. Fowler,91 with the treatment that case would
have received had it been purely domestic. In Bernkrant, a promise
was made by the decedent for debt forgiveness by will as part of a
84. It seemingly abandoned that approach, at least in part, in favor of narrow,
policy-based rules in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335
N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). See Sedler, Interstate Accidents, supra note 56, at 125-37.
85.

Reese, Rules or Approach, supra note 9, at 318.

86. von Mehren, Recent Trends, supra note 72, at 942.
87. As to the difficulty in determining policies and interests, see also the
discussions in Rheinstein, supra note 8, at 663; Rosenberg, supra note 79, at 464.
88. Reese, ChiefJudge Fuld, supra note 9, at 559. He also maintains that each
decision would have little or no precedential effect, because "[ilt is entirely possible
for two identically worded statutes to have been enacted for different purposes."
Id.
89. Id. at 559-60.
90. Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in CURRIE,
supra note I, at 183-84 (article originally published at 1959 DUKE L.J. 171).
91.

55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
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land financing transaction. The decedent was presumed to be
domiciled in California at the time the promise was made, while the
claimants were domiciled in Nevada, where the land was situated.
The decedent's will did not contain the promised debt forgiveness
and the claimants brought suit in California to enforce the
provision,
contract. The
purported contract to will was enforceable under
Nevada law, but the decedent's representative claimed it violated
the California statute of frauds pertaining to wills. The California
court applied Nevada law and rejected the defense. 92
It is my submission that the court reached this result because it
treated the case as involving a commercial contract rather than a
true contract to will. 93 The decedent was not trying to pass a portion
of the estate by his will, but to the contrary, in the words of the
lower court, was engaged in a "sporting proposition, "9' and hoped
that he would live long enough to avoid forgiving any of the debt.
Since what was involved was not a true contract to will, the policy
behind the California statute of frauds pertaining to wills would not
be advanced by that statute's application to a commercial contract.9 5
Had the same court been confronted with a true contract to will, it
would very likely have held that California law, the law of the
decedent's domicile, applied.'
If Bernkrant had been a purely domestic case, where all
parties were residents of California and the land was situated there,
the California court would have had to make the same determination: whether the California statute of frauds pertaining to wills was
applicable to this "sporting proposition." It is difficult to see how
the California court would have had more difficulty in determining
the policy behind California's statute of frauds pertaining to wills in
Bernkrant than it would have had in the purely domestic case
posited above, and in such a case it likely would have held that
the statute of frauds did not apply. Since a court must regularly
92. In speaking of that case, Currie says: "The restraint and moderation with
which domestic interests are defined raise a standard to which the wise and honest
can repair, and should be a reproach to those who feel that the method of governmental-interest analysis must necessarily produce egocentric or provincial resuits." Justice Traynor and the Conflict of.Laws, in CURRIE, supra note I, at 688-89
n.236 (article originally published at 13 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1969)). See also Currie,
The Disinterested Third State, supra note 1, at 761-63.
93. See Sedler, Characterization, Identification of the Problem Area and the
Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws: An Exercise in Judicial Method, 2 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 8, 89-95 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sedler, Characterization].

94. Id. at 89-90.
95. A true contract to will was involved in Emery v. Burbank, 163 Mass. 326,
39 N.E. 1026 (1895). The decedent's domicile, using the traditional approach,
applied its own law to invalidate the contract.
96. Sedler, Characterization,supra note 93, at 94.
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determine the policy behind its own laws in deciding on their
application in domestic cases, no reason appears why it cannot
make the same determination of policy in cases containing a foreign
element. 9
One reason that the critics of interest analysis have seen such
difficulty in determining the policies behind the laws of the involved
states is their failure to distinguish between legislative purpose and

legislative motivation. Legislative purpose refers to the objectives a
law is designed to accomplish, while legislative motivation may be
defined as factors stimulating enactment of a law. For example, if
the legislature imposes a limit on the amount recoverable for wrong-

ful death, its purpose obviously is to limit damages awards in such
cases, and the policy reflected in such a law is to protect defendants

and insurers from what the legislature considers to be excessive
liability. Motivation, however, may vary from one legislator to the

next. Some may have feared excessive verdicts in wrongful death
cases and believed that such verdicts would be unjust. Others may

have been concerned about rising insurance premiums. Others simply may have responded to the pressures of the insurance lobby.98
In determining, both in the conflicts and non-conflicts situa-

tion, the policy behind a rule of substantive law, what is relevant is
legislative purpose, not legislative motivation." That purpose can
be determined from the provisions of the law itself, viewed functionally and in relation to other laws of the state dealing with the

same subject. As the example above indicates, a collective motivation cannot be ascribed to the legislature,"o but a collective purpose
can. That purpose must be found in the provisions of the law that the
legislature has enacted. It is this collective purpose that determines
the policy behind a rule of substantive law under interest analysis. 01
97. So too, in determining the policy behind the law of another state, the court
puts itself in the position of the courts of that state when called upon to decide the
law's application in a domestic case and "imputes those policies to a foreign law
which it could conceive a rational foreign court adopting' were that foreign court
deciding the case at hand." False Conflicts, supra note 38, at 85.
98. For a discussion of legislative motivation in the constitutional context by
the Supreme Court, see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-84 (1968).
99. See notes 28-34 & accompanying text supra in regard to the determination
of legislative policy in Grant v. McAuliffe.
100. As Professor Ratner has noted, identification of the policies behind a rule
of substantive law
focuses not on the motives or intentions of the legislators who enacted the
statute or of the judges who developed the common law rule but on
community purposes or goals as disclosed by the problems that evoked the
rule, its function in the network of existing community arrangements, and
the beneficial consequences to the community of its implementation.
Ratner, Choice of Law: Interest Analysis and Cost Contribution, 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 817, 819 (1974).
101. While "purpose" and "policy" are sometimes used interchangeably in a
discussion of interest analysis, we will use only "policy," noting that "policy" is
used to describe the collective legislative purpose.
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In trying to identify the policy behind a rule of substantive law,

then, the court must ask what the rule was designed to accomplish
and what in fact it will accomplish if applied to the kind of case that

is now before it.'0 2 Currie emphasized that the court must look for

the rational and legitimate policy behind the rule in question,' 03 and
for those "asserted policies and principles which are genuinely held
and adequately supported by available evidence. 1 The court
should also look to the contemporary policy that a law serves,

totally apart from the policy that it may have served at an earlier
time. 05 The point to be emphasized is that the policies behind a rule
of substantive law are to be determined functionally with reference

to the law's provisions and in relation to other laws of the state
dealing with the same subject.
This process is illustrated in a different context by the Supreme
Court's analysis of the asserted purposes of state laws or other
governmental action when their constitutionality is in issue. For
example, in Eisenstadt v. Baird," the Court considered the con-

stitutionality of a law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives
except to married persons for whom contraceptives were prescribed
by a physician. The state first tried to justify the measure on the
ground that it was designated to discourage non-marital sexual relationships. Fornication, however, was a misdemeanor entailing, at
most, a three month sentence, while violation of the anticontracep-

tive statute was a felony punishable by five years imprisonment.
This being so, it was patently unreasonable to believe that the state
had chosen to implement its prohibition against fornication by
subjecting the distributor of contraceptives to twenty times the
punishment imposed against a fornicator. 017 Then the state argued

that the statute was a health measure. The Court rejected this
102. This has elsewhere been referred to as the "mischief approach." D. ST. L.
KELLY, LOCALIZING RULES IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 84-85 (1974). Currie also

notes that determination of policy and interest is a matter for the courts, and that all
that "conflict of laws technicians" can do is to "postulate state policies and
interests." The Verdict of Quiescent Years, in CURRIE, supra note 1,at 591-92
(article originally published at 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 258 (1961)).
103. See notes 31-34 & accompanying text supra.
104. SHAPIRA, supra note 64, at 147. As to the problems that may arise where
the legislature has failed to express the policy with sufficient clarity, see the
discussion in CURRIE, supra note 1,at 344-50.
105. See Ehrenzweig, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. REV. 570,
580-83 (1968). Professor Ehrenzweig was making this point with respect to the
forum's determination of the policy reflected in its own law in order to decide on its
scope of application. See also SHAPIRA, supra note 69, at 145. In Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court noted that while the justification for antiabortion laws when first enacted may have been to protect pregnant women from a
hazardous medical procedure, the retention of those laws by the states after the
medical danger had been removed could serve a different purpose, namely the
protection of potential human life, and approached the constitutionality of those
laws with reference to this "contemporary" purpose. Id. at 147-52.
106. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
107. Id. at 449-50.
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argument on the grounds that not all contraceptives were dangerous,
and a physician competent to prescribe contraceptives for married
persons was also competent to prescribe contraceptives for unmarried persons. Thus, looking to the content of the law and its relation
to other laws, the Court concluded that it could not serve the rational
and legitimate purpose either of deterring fornication or protecting
public health.'0
The same kind of approach was taken in the choice of law
context by the New York Court of Appeals in Tooker v. Lopez,"°
where the court held that a "rational" policy behind the Michigan
guest statute could not have been to give priority in the assets of the0
driver to a non-negligent third party over the guest passenger."
The content of the guest statute did not support such a purpose. If
the purpose had been to give priority to the non-negligent third
party, the statute would have barred suit by the guest passenger
entirely."' Instead, it allowed, suit by the guest passenger against
the host driver whenever gross negligence could be shown. The
court concluded, "The only justification for discrimination between injured guests which can withstand logical as well as constitutional scrutiny . . . is that the legitimate purpose of the statute-prevention of fraudulent claims against local insurers or the
protection of local automobile owners-is furthered by increasing
the guest's burden of proof."" ' 2 As these examples should indicate
most clearly, there is ordinarily no real difficulty in determining the
policies behind a state's law when those policies are determined
functionally with reference to the content of the law and in relation
to other laws of the state dealing with the same subject.
The other reason why the critics have seen such difficulty is
that they have been trying to identify a single or primary policy
behind the law in question. For purposes of interest analysis, a rule
of substantive law should be presumed to reflect all legitimate
policies that it could possibly serve. Experience indicates that when
multiple policies are assumed they will usually support the same
108. Id. at 452. See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), where
the Court concluded that the purpose of providing a "mother's benefit" for the
widow of a deceased worker covered by Social Security, who died leaving a child,
was to enable the mother to stay at home with the child, and that with this as the
purpose, there was no rational basis for denying a "father's benefit" to the widower of a deceased worker. As to the Supreme Court's present scrutiny of asserted
governmental purposes in constitutional cases, see generally Gunther. In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L.REV. 1 (1972).
109. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
110. The court had earlier ascribed such a purpose to a similar Colorado statute
in Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965). See
Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 4, at 74-77 (discussion of
Dym).
111. 24 N.Y.2d at 575, 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
112. Id.
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conclusion as to which state is interested in applying its law in order
to implement those policies. That is, it is rare for one policy to
indicate a state's interest in applying its law while another policy
points to a lack of interest. For example, assume the policy behind a
guest statute is found to be threefold:" 3 (1) to protect hosts from
suits by ungrateful guests, (2) to protect insurers from collusive
suits," 4 and (3) to exclude guest-passenger cases from the insurer's
liability, thereby possibly lowering insurance rates or increasing
insurance companies' profits. The only state interested in applying a
guest statute to implement any or all of these policies is the defendant's home state,"15 where the vehicle is insured, and where the
consequences of imposing liability, including the charging of the
accident for the purposes of the insurer's loss experience, will be
felt." 6 Thus, there is no utility whatsoever in engaging in debate
over the primary policy behind a guest statute because when multiple policies are assumed, the matter of policy and the matter of
interests merge.
The identification of the policy behind one state's rule of
substantive law may also serve to identify the policy of the state
having the opposite rule of law. The state that does not have a guest
statute, for example, has a policy of allowing compensation to all
persons injured by the ordinary negligence of another, including
guest passengers injured by the negligence of host drivers. And the
state that does not have a statute of frauds has a policy of enforcing
oral contracts, even at the price of having to determine more
disputed claims than if it required agreements to be expressed with
greater formality. In other words, once the court has determined the
113. As to the possibility of multiple purposes behind a guest statute, see
Reese, Chief Judge Fuld, supra note 9, at 558-59.
114. Although in a sense, these two purposes seem logically inconsistent, it is
not unreasonable to ascribe both purposes to the legislature, i.e., in cases where
there was a prior relationship between the parties, collusion is likely to occur, while
in cases where there was not, the host should be protected against suit by the
"ungrateful guest."
115. In Tooker, the court assumed that the Michigan guest statute reflected
multiple policies. So too, a law providing for family immunity may be assumed to
reflect both a policy of protecting family harmony and a seemingly inconsistent
policy of protecting insurers from collusive suits by family members. In either
event, the only state interested in applying its law to allow the defense is the state of
the family domicile, which is also the state where the automobile is insured. See
Sedler, Characterization, supra note 93, at 52-54. Likewise some laws reflect both
an admonitory and a compensatory policy, e.g., a dram shop act, and both policies
should be presumed for purposes of interest analysis.
116. It is very unlikely that the existence of a guest statute as such will have any
appreciable effect on insurance rates. See the "classic" discussion of this point in
Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of
Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 574-77 (1961). In any event, since insurance rates are
based on loss experience in a territory of insureds, id. at 567-69, the accident will be
charged to the loss experience of drivers in the defendant's home state irrespective
of where it occurs, and recovery will affect the profits of the insurer's business in
that state.
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to have
policy behind one of the conflicting laws, it is very1 likely
17
determined the policy behind the other law as well.
b. Difficulty in Determining Interest. Even less difficult than
defining the policy behind a rule of substantive law is determining a
state's interest in applying that rule of substantive law in order to
implement the policy reflected therein; identification of a law's

policy or policies will usually make it clear whether each state is
interested in applying its law on the point in issue. Just as a court in
a domestic case must decide whether a statute should be applicable
to a situation not clearly within its terms, in a conflicts case a court
must decide whether the application of a statute or common law rule
in the circumstances presented effectuates the legislative purpose. II-

As Professor Kramer has put it, the question of whether a state's
rule of law should be applied in a conflicts case depends on
''whether the reasons or governmental interests behind the state's

policy are such that the state has a logical, rational, legitimate cause
to apply its policy to the case in question, in spite of the foreign
elements involved in the case, because the local elements of the
case-the parties, the subject matter, the transactions, the accident,
the injury-bear a rational relationship to the reasons and interest
behind the policy of the state." ' 9
Professor Westen has formulated four general categories of
117. This is not to say that there never may be any difficulty in determining
whether a particular policy should be ascribed to a particular rule of substantive
law. For example, a rule making contributory negligence a complete bar to tort
recovery, while clearly reflecting a policy respecting loss allocation resulting from
accidents, could also be said to represent an admonitory policy, i.e., it is designed
to encourage a higher standard of conduct by completely barring recovery to a party
who is even slightly at fault. While this does not seem to be a very realistic policy, it
is not clearly irrational to ascribe such a policy to this rule. In practice, however,
such situations will be fairly rare. Here, for example, the need to determine whether
a rule of contributory negligence involves both policies will arise only when the
forum is a contributory negligence state and the parties are from a comparative
negligence state. This situation is unlikely to arise, since the plaintiff almost certainly will bring suit in the home state, which will apply its comparative negligence rule.
See Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968).
118. To quote Professor Hancock: "Generally speaking, the court's basic task
in a choice-of-law case is analogous to that in a Wholly domestic case; it must decide
whether or not an unforeseen set of facts comes within the policy range of a
statutory or non-statutory domestic rule." Hancock, Torts Problems in Conflict of
Laws Resolved by Statutory Construction: The Halley and Other Older Cases
Revisited, 18 U. TORONTO L.J. 331, 340 (1968). See also SHAPIRA, supra note 64,
at 120; Ratner, supra note 100, at 819; False Conflicts, supra note 38, at 80.
119. Kramer, Interests and Policy Clashes in Conflict of Laws, 13 RUTGERS L.
REV. 523, 532 (1959). Professor Seidelson has stated the test in terms of the
relationship between the law in question and the litigants involved. "Indetermining
whether a potentially interested state has a substantial interest in the issue presented, the forum should [ask if] one of the litigants is within the specific class of
persons intended to be directly affected by that state's dispositive law, either
beneficially or adversely." Seidelson, Interest Analysis: For Those Who Like It and
Those Who Don't, II DuQ. L. REV. 283, 304 (1973).
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interest.1 20 A state is interested, he says, in applying its law to a
particular case (1) when one of the persons it presumes to protect is
a party to the dispute, (2) when conduct it finds culpable transpired
within the state, (3) when its courts are invoked to resolve a dispute
which it wishes to avoid, or (4) when persons with a financial stake
in litigation are residents of the state.
The first category of interest generally refers to the forum's
application of its protective policy on behalf of its residents, who
are the "logical beneficiaries" of such protection. For example,
when the forum's law allows recovery in an accident situation, it
has chosen to protect accident victims. Clearly it is interested in
applying that policy for the benefit of its resident accident victims,
irrespective of where the accident occurs, since the social and
economic consequences of the accident will be felt in the state of the
victim's residence. 1" So too, when a state immunizes, for instance,
the host driver and insurer in the guest statute situation, 22 it is
interested in applying its policy whenever such an immune party is a
resident of the state. This interest arises, again, because the consequences of denying immunity and, correlatively, of imposing liability will be felt in that state. Generally then, any rule that precludes or limits liability has the effect of protecting defendants as a
class, and the defendant's home state ordinarily is interested 2in
3
applying its protective policy in favor of its resident defendants.
The second category of interest is self-explanatory: the state
whose law reflects an admonitory policy is always interested in
applying its law to implement that policy whenever the conduct in
question occurs within the state. This interest arises totally apart
from any compensatory interest the state may also have. 24 A
similar interest exists on the part of the state whose law reflects an
admonitory policy whenever the conduct it finds culpable created a
foreseeable risk of harm and, in fact, caused
harm there, although
1 25
the conduct took place in another state.
The third category of interest refers to the forum's application
of its procedural rule which limits or disallows the bringing of suits
of the type before the court. This category should be expanded to
120. False Conflicts, supra note 38, at 80-81.
121.

See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414

U.S. 856 (1973); Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
122. See, e.g., Fuerste v, Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968).
123. See, e.g., Maguire v. Exeter & Hampton Elec. Co., 114 N.H. 589, 325
A.2d 778 (1974). See also Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 317-18, 546
P.2d 719, 721-22, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, 217-18, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
124. See, e.g., Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Williams v.
Rawlings Truck Line, 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel,
Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
125. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
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make it clear that the forum qua forum always has an interest, for
reasons of judicial efficiency and conservation of court resources, in
applying its laws that reflect a strong procedural policy to all
litigation being conducted in its courts.' 6
The fourth category, any interest arising from a resident's
financial stake, may have been formulated too broadly if it is taken
to mean that the forum can apply its law solely on the basis of the
residency of one of the parties in the forum. In a contract case, for
instance, the legitimacy of a state's applying its own law solely on
the ground that the party who stands to gain or lose is a forum
resident is dependent on the nature of the contract of the issue in
question.127 At the same time, however, the fact of residency may
give a state a legitimate interest in allowing recovery on certain
kinds of claims, such as life insurance contracts involving forum
residents, 128 or in extending its "anti-contractual" protective policy
29
to forum residents who have entered into contracts elsewhere.1
These general categories of interest furnish a useful guide to
the determination of when a state is interested in applying its law in
order to implement the policies it reflects. In practice it is simply not
difficult to identify the policies reflected in the laws of the involved
states, and the interest of each state, in light of these policies, in
having its law applied on the point in issue.
Critics have suggested, 3 ° however, and it cannot be denied
that where a court wants to apply its own law, it may "manufacture" policies and interests. 13' But a court that wants to apply its
own law for whatever reason can always manipulate the approach it
126. For a discussion of the forum's procedural policy and how this relates to
the extent to which it will use foreign law as a model in a case in which it is
otherwise "disinterested," see Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to
Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 813, 823-825
(1962). The state's interest in implementing its procedural policy stands on the same
"constitutional footing" as its interest in implementing its substantive policy. Wells
v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
127. The forum would not have a legitimate interest in applying its own law, for
example, where a forum resident asserts the forum's statute of frauds defense in a
claim involving a contract connected entirely with another state. See Sedler,
Characterization, supra note 93, at 83-84.
128. See, e.g., Zogg v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 276 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960);
Sedler, Contracts Provisions, supra note 58 at 312.
129. See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964); Potlatch
No. 1 Fed. Credit Union v. Kennedy, 76 Wash. 2d 806, 459 P.2d 32 (1969). See also
the discussion in Sedler, Contracts Provisions, supra note 58, at 306-07, 311-12.
130. See notes 88-89 & accompanying text supra.
131. See, e.g., Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968),
where the court claimed that its rule allowing recovery for ordinary negligence
reflected an admonitory policy, so as to give Wisconsin an interest in applying its
law to allow recovery when the accident occurred in Wisconsin although both
parties resided in a guest statute state. This reasoning, although not the result, was
subsequently repudiated by the court. Hunker v. Royal Indem. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 588,
603-04, 204 N.W.2d 897, 905-06 (1973).
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is purportedly following. This practice was widespread when all
courts were following the territorially-based rules of the traditional
approach,' 3 2 and is equally evident under other "modern" approaches to choice of law.' 3 3 When a court "manipulates" an
approach, the fault is that of the court, not of the approach. Interest
analysis is no more subject to "manipulation" than any other
approach to choice of law. To the contrary, interest analysis, which
calls for a straightforward determination of the policies and interests

of the involved states, and in Currie's view, for the application of
the forum's law in the case of the true conflict, probably furnishes
less motivation than other approaches for judicial manipulation.
B.

The Alternatives
The two major modern alternatives to interest analysis as a
basic approach to choice134of law are (1) territorialism and (2) narrow, policy-based rules.
1. Territorialism
The essence of territorialism, or the "new and enlightened
territorialism," as it has been called, 135 is that choice of law decisions should be made with reference to the place where legally
significant events occurred rather than with reference to the policies
and interests reflected in the laws of the involved states. The
approach owes its origin to Professor Cavers' territorially-based

principles of preference, which he originally formulated as solutions
to the true conflict, 36 but which he subsequently indicated may
have broader application.1 37 Cavers' new territorialism was developed by Professor Twerski, into a full-blown alternative to what he
132. See Sedler, Babcock v. Johnson in Kentucky, supra note 4, at 48-53
(discussion of the use of manipulative techniques).
133. Courts that are purporting to apply the Restatement Second's most significant relationship approach, for example, usually find that their state is the state of
the most significant relationship on the point in issue. See, e.g., Haines v. MidCentury Life Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W.2d 328 (1970).
134. As to the approach of the Restatement Second, see note 58 supra.
135. As opposed to the "old territorialism" that formed the basis of the traditional approach. See Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor CaversThe Pennsylvania Method, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 373 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Twerski,
Enlightened Territorialism].
136.

See generally D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS, ch. 5 (1965)

[hereinafter cited as CAVERS]. Cavers refers to the "hard cases, those cases in
which legislative purposes are unclear or conflicting, cases which cannot be disposed of as posing either false conflicts or situations in which the claims of one
state's law to application are plainly preponderant." Id. at 122.
137. Principally in regard to determining "whether and how a legislature has
spoken on a question of choice and whether the conflict is false or may readily be
avoided." Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, 131
RECUEIL DES COURS 75, 153 (1970).
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calls "pure" interest analysis. 3 8 While not eliminating consideration of the policy behind a law and the interest of a state in
applying its law, 139 Twerski scathingly attacks the single factor
approach that he sees embodied in interest analysis. He insists that
looking only to the policies and interests reflected in the substantive
laws of the involved states introduces a "new rigidity" on the
choice of law scene. 140
Twerski finds interest analysis objectionable because it fails to
take account of the "time and space dimensions" 141 which are at the
heart of his territorialism. For example, he faults the New York
court's use of interest analysis in Tooker v. Lopez.142 In that case,
involving New York parties who were attending school in Michigan
and who were on a trip from one point in Michigan to another when
the accident occurred, the New York court applied its own law on
the issue of guest statute immunity. To Twerski, the court erred in
ignoring the fact that the accident was connected entirely with
Michigan. He says that the result enables a party "to travel in the
United States with the tough tort-law of his home state on his
back. "543 More generally, he criticizes interest analysis for what he
sees to be its orientation toward the law of the place where people
live rather than toward the law of the place where things happened.'" He also insists that the presumptive applicability of the
45
forum's own law, which is a part of Currie's interest analysis,1
causes the courts to avoid the task of "sensitively balancing" the
interests involved. 46 As he concludes, "Interest analysis as presof
ently expounded is a simplistic tool which stands in the way 47
sensitive judicial evaluation of complex issues of fact and law." 1
As an alternative Twerski proposes "enlightened territorialism." While conceding that a state's governmental interest should
138. According to Professor Twerski, "pure" interest analysis "looks solely to
the state policies that underlie a particular law," while territorialism emphasizes the
"geographical and temporal contacts of the controversy with the jurisdiction whose
law is to be applied." Twerski, Book Review, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1046 n. 12
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Twerski, Book Review].
139. And thus, Twerski refers to himself as a part of the "interest analysis
camp." Id. at 1046.
140. See Twerski, To Where Does One Attach the Horses, 61 Ky. L.J. 393, 399400, 407-10 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Twerski, Attach the Horses].
141. "Time and space dimensions" refer to the place or places where the
parties were acting when legally significant events occurred. Twerski, Enlightened
Territorialism,supra note 135, at 390.
142. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 209 N.E.2d 792, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1965).
143. Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism, supra note 135 at 380-81.
144. See the discussion in Twerski, Neumeier v. Kuehner: Where Are the
Emperor's Clothes?, I HOFSTRA L. REV. 104, 108-10 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Twerski, Emperor's Clothes].
145. See note 16 supra.
146. Twerski, Attach the Horses, supra note 140, at 405.
147. Id. at 412.
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be taken into account, he clearly subordinates that factor to time and
space dimensions: Where "[t]he fact pattern is so heavily dominated by one state that our sense of justice says that it is fair for the
state's law to govern, another state's governmental interest may
have to take a back seat to territorialism."' 48 Despite Twerski's
claim that he is seeking a "fundamental reconciliation of territorialist and interest analysis thinking,'" 49 it is interest analysis that
always takes the back seat: It is relevant only when there is a
substantial coincidence between a state's interest in applying its law
and the state's time and space connection with the transaction in
question. It is Twerski's submission that in practice "juridical
events tend to be rather heavily centered in one jurisdiction or
another,"' and that, "[w]here the center of a juridical event is
clearly defined in one' 5jurisdiction then the law of that state ought
generally to govern.' '
Twerski relates time and space dimensions to expectations,
foreseeability and comprehensibility. His theory is that the courts
should apply the law that people would expect to govern their
activity, regardless of whether reliance on that law affected their
conduct.152 Territorialism also serves the objectives of foreseeability and comprehensibility "because of our innate tendency--due to
the importance of territorial organization for daily social, political
and economic life-to think in territorial terms."'5 Twerski ascribes to lawmakers, as well, a territorial orientation. The moral
judgments reflected in ,astate's law should apply to events within
the state. 5 4 All of these considerations, says Twerski, should lead
the courts to focus on the time and space dimensions of a case, and
in its total factual context to locate the
"to view a juridical event
55
vortex of that event."1
148. Twerski, Book Review, supra note 138, at 1052. This would be true, even
though in terms of Currie's interest analysis, the case would present a false conflict.
See also the discussion of "territorialism and the false conflict" in Couch, Louisiana Adopts Interest Analysis: Applause and Some Reservations, 49 TUL. L. REV. 1,
5-8 (1974).

149. Twerski, Book Review, supra note 138, at 1047.
150. This is because, he says, people tend to orient their lives toward central
focal points.
151. Twerski, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 144, at 120. In his view the
essence of this is the "enlightened territorialism" of Professor Cavers and of the
Restatement Second. Id.
152. As he puts it, "People have a right to expect a regularity and rhythm from

the law. . . .To demean 'time and space' in the law of conflicts is to deny an
important facet of human experience." Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism, supra
note 135, at 382. A similar view has been expressed by Kegel, who notes that,
"spatial factors are part and parcel of the stock-in-trade of conflicts law," Kegel,
supra note 8, at 189.
153. Here Twerski borrows from von Mehren, Recent Trends, supra note 72,
at 956. See also the discussion of "territorial organization" in CAVERS, supra note
136, at 134-36.
154. Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism, supra note 135, at 385.
155. Twerski, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 144, at 123. The "vortex of the
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Locating the vortex of the event means emphasizing factual
contacts and greatly downplaying the policies and interests of the
involved states. In Tooker, for example, which in terms of interest
analysis presents the false conflict, Twerski would say that New
York should displace its own law because the vortex of the accident
was in Michigan, where the parties were attending school and

where the trip originated and was to end.' 56 The emphasis being on
time and space dimensions, the law of the state that is the vortex of
the event should apply. 57
'

All of the underlying premises on which Twerski's "enlightened territorialism" is based are subject to the most serious dis-

pute. 158 To say that people expect the law of a state having time and
space connections with the transaction to govern, and that it would
be "incomprehensible" if it did not, is truly to be self-serving. If

people think in these terms-and it is doubtful that they do-it is

only because they have been conditioned to do so by the traditional

emphasis on territorialism in American law.1 59 Territorial predilections still plague the courts' 6 0 and the commentators,' 16 and it is
easy to project them onto the general public. Moreover, many

people do not live their lives oriented to particular states, but to
what may be called functional socio-economic and mobility areas
that cut across state lines.' 6 2 It seems somewhat anomalous to say
that legal rights should depend on which side of the state line

particular events occur if that state line is not functionally significant for the people who are involved in those events.163 Territorialism ignores reality in favor of a hypothetical "expectation" which it
may be doubted exists at all.
event" concept is very similar to the Restatement Second's "state of the most
significant relationship" concept, at least insofar as the latter concept is not "swallowed up" by policy considerations. See note 58 supra.
156. Twerski, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 144, at 123.
157. In Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972), the victim was a resident
of Kentucky, a recovery state, and the defendant was a resident of Ohio, a guest
statute state, but worked in Kentucky. The trip began in Kentucky and was to end
there. The accident occurred there. Twerski says that the vortex of the event was in
Kentucky. Twerski, Attach the Horses, supra note 140, at 396-400.
158. Interestingly enough, Twerski's methodology ends up focusing on a single
factor-factual contacts. Having criticized interest analysis for its single factor
method, Twerski falls into the same purported error. Similarly, his demand for
-sensitive judicial evaluation of complex issues of fact and law" is lost sight of in
the quest for locating the vortex of the event.
159. As to the traditional emphasis on territorialism, see Sedler, Babcock v.
Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 4, at 37-41.
160. See Sedler, The Territorial Imperative: Automobile Accidents and the
Significance of a State Line, 9 DuQ. L. REV. 394, 402, 410-12 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Sedler, TerritorialImperative].
161. See the discussion in Sedler, Weintraub'sCommentary on the Conflict of
Laws: The Chapteron Torts, 57 IOwA L. REV. 1229, 1236 (1972).
162. A good example is the New York City metropolitan area which encompasses parts of New York, Connecticut and New Jersey. See Sedler, Territorial
Imperative, supra note 160, at 398-99.
163. See id. at 407-12.
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Twerski's contention that the moral judgment reflected in a
state's law should apply only to events within that state'" is also
doubtful. Laws also reflect specific policies and it would seem that
the law-giver is more concerned with the implementation of the
policy than with expressing a moral judgment by applying the law to
all persons located within the "vortex." It is most doubtful that the
New York legislators who refused to enact a guest statute because
they wanted passengers to be able to recover against the host and the
host's insurer intended that recovery be denied to the New York
plaintiff in a case like Tooker because the vortex of the event was
not in New York. It is also most doubtful that they were making a
moral judgment applicable only where New York was the vortex of
the event. It would very likely be "incomprehensible" to the
legislators and would defeat their "expectations" if a New York
accident victim could not recover against the owner of a New Yorkinsured automobile merely because the accident occurred in another
state where the parties had "come to rest.' ' 165 So too, since the
insurer is required to cover the New York-insured automobile for
out-of-state accidents, it would not be "incomprehensible" to it if it
were required to pay for an accident where the vortex of the event
was outside of New York. So long as a choice of law decision does
not produce any unfairness, it cannot be viewed as "incomprehensible."
At bottom, the crucial disagreements between interest analysis
and territorialism are over the purpose of conflicts law, and, in light
of that purpose, over the resulting criteria for choice of law decisions. If the purpose is to produce sound results in the cases that
come before the courts, this end is better effected by the use of
interest analysis than by Twerski's territorialism which, it is submitted, represents a theoretical construct that bears no relationship
to the realities of the world in which people live. These realities will
be better served by making choice of law decisions with reference to
the policies and interests of the involved states regardless of the
vortex of the event.
2.

Narrow, Policy-Based Rules
The other basic alternative to interest analysis is that of narrow, policy-based rules. Interest analysis, of course, eschews
choice of law rules of any sort; in the view of many of its critics, this is its most serious failing.' 66 While conceding that the
rigid, territorially-based rules of the original Restatement were
164. twerski, Enlightened Territorialism,supra note 135, at 385.
165. This phrase is borrowed from Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120,209 N.E.2d
792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
166. See Hill, supra note 8, at 480-81; Juenger, supra note 61, at 210-11;
Rosenberg, supra note 74, at 464.
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unsatisfactory, some critics of interest analysis have now also become proponents of narrow policy-based rules. Professor Reese
maintains that the "current unpopularity of rules in choice of law"
is an overreaction to the failure of the Restatement's rules, particularly in the torts and contract areas, and that this "does not mean
. •
. that satisfactory rules cannot be devised [in these areas]...
only that rules similar in character to those previously attempted are
unlikely to prove successful."' 6 7
Reese refers to interest analysis as an "approach" to choice of
law. An "approach," to him, is a "system which does no more
than state what factor or factors should be considered in arriving at a
conclusion. 61 His reasons for preferring "rules" over "approaches"' 169 are as follows:
Rules are employed in most areas of the law 'I70 1. . . because of the advantages that rules bring[:] . . . certainty
and predictability . . . [and] the fact that they greatly
facilitate the judicial task171] All that a judge need do when
deciding a question covered by a rule is to select the proper
rule and then, after gaining an understanding of its provisions, to apply it. Far more difficult is the task of a judge
when an approach is involved. Here he is told simply to
consider one or more enumerated factors in arriving at his
conclusion and usually is given little, if any, guidance as to
the relative weight he should give these factors. As a
result, each decision will be essentially ad hoc and the
judge will rarely be able to rely upon or even to obtain
much guidance from earlier opinions.1[21
Reese contends that it is now possible to develop narrow
choice of law rules that are based on considerations of policy. In
167. Reese, Rules or Approach, supra note 9, at 319. As Professor Rosenberg
has so neatly put it, "The problem is to escape both horns of the dilemma by
avoiding both unreasonable rules and an unruly reasonableness that is destructive
of many of the values of law and loses sight of the need for coordinating a multistate
system, not merely vindicating substantive law policies." Rosenberg, supra note
74, at 464.
168. Reese, Rules or Approach, supra note 9, at 315.

169. Professor Reese, who was the Reporter for the Restatement Second,
characterizes the general choice of law principles set forth in § 6 of the Restatement
as an approach. Id.
170. In other areas of law, however, it may be noted that these rules generally
are either contained in statutes or have been developed by judicial decision on a

case by case basis. Unlike choice of law rules, they have not been formulated a
priori and applied deductively to particular cases. See the discussion in Sedler,
Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 3, at -.

171. Professor Leflar, however, has emphasized that the choice-influencing
consideration of "simplification of the judicial task" does not justify the adoption

of "mechanical"

choice of law rules, and that "ease in judicial performance is

ordinarily not of first importance among the choice-influencing considerations."
Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1584, 1587 (1966).

172. Reese, Rules or Approach, supra note 9, at 316-17.
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formulating a rule, says Reese, there should be an effort "to
determine whether in the great majority of situations a particular
state will be that of greatest concern by reason of a particular
contact irrespective of all other considerations, including the content of its relevant local law rule." '73 The rule should be designed to
further the basic policy underlying the substantive law field with
which it is concerned. 174 Protection of the "natural expectations of
the parties," including the expectations that they presumably would
have had if their minds had been directed to the issue at hand, is
another relevant consideration in formulating particular rules.175
Finally, Reese emphasizes that: "A choice of law rule that works
well in the great majority of situations should be applied even in a
case where it might not reach 1ideal
results. Good rules, like other
76
advantages, have their price."
Reese gives a number of examples of rules that he would
formulate under these criteria: The law of the situs should govern
questions such as who may own the land, the conditions under
which it may be held, and the uses to which it may be put; 177 family
immunity should be determined by the law of the domicile; I" in the
guest statute situation, where the guest and the host have a common
domicile, the law of that state should apply. 79 Clearly a substantial
start has been made80 toward the formulation of a body of narrow,
policy-based rules.
My criticism of choice of law rules relates both to my view of
how conflicts problems can best be solved and to the role of the
courts in fashioning these solutions. Which approach, it should be
asked, will generally produce better results: to decide each case
with reference to the policies and interests of the involved states, or
to formulate rules, however narrow and policy-based they may be?
Built into any concept of choice of law rules, as Professor Reese
admits,"' l is the possibility of unsound results in particular cases.
This possibility is not built into interest analysis and case-by-case
173. Id. at 326.
174.
175.

Id. at 330.
Id. at 329.

176. Id. at 334. As he also puts it:
More specifically, the fact that a choice of law rule which has stood the test
of experience would lead on some rare occasion to the application of the
law of a state which is not that of greatest concern, or would result in the
disregard of other multistate or local law policies, is not an adequate reason
why the rule should not be applied on that occasion. Perfection is not for
this world. The advantages which good rules bring are worth the price of an
occasional doubtful result.
Id. at 322.
177. Id. at 327.
178. Id. See also Sedler, Characterization,supra note 93, at 65-68.
179. Reese, Rules or Approach, supra note 9, at 328.
180. See id. at 328-32.
181. See notes 175-76 & accompanying text supra.
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adjudication. 82 In addition, as will be pointed out shortly, once we
recognize the responsibility of the courts to resolve conflicts problems and apply the normal workings of binding precedent and stare
decisis to conflicts cases,1 83 we will see that we will have rules of
choice of law, based on the courts' decisions in actual cases, which
will serve the same "predictability" function as choice of law rules
without the built-in disadvantage of countenancing unsound results
in particular cases.
The difference between the results reached by the application
of choice of law rules, even if narrowly formulated and policybased, and the results that build on a case-by-case analysis of the
policies and interests of the involved states can be illustrated by a
consideration of one of Professor Reese's proposed rules: Questions
of family immunity should be determined by the law of the marital
domicile. When spouses from a recovery state are involved in an
accident in an immunity state, a false conflict is presented and the
law of the marital domicile, as the law of the only interested state,
should apply.' 84 When spouses from an immunity state are involved
in an accident in a recovery state, the same case in terms of interest
analysis is not necessarily presented since the state where the
accident occurred may see an interest in applying its law to allow
non-residents injured there to recover. 85 The rule proposed by
Professor Reese would foreclose judicial inquiry into the matter of
policies and interests in such a case, which regardless of one's view
of the legitimacy of the interest of the accident state, does, at least,
raise a different question from that presented when spouses from a
recovery state are involved in an accident in an immunity state.
Where the rule clearly may lead to unsound results is where
policies other than those associated with family immunity are involved. Suppose that spouses from an immunity state are involved
in a two-car accident in a recovery state. The driver of the other
vehicle, a resident of the recovery state, is sued by the injured wife,
182. This does not mean that they could not occur, only that their existence is
not built into the approach itself.
183. See generally Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 4, at
82-87 (discussion of judicial method).
184. See note 178 supra.
185. See Sedler, Characterization, supra note 93, at 61-62. While the parties'
home state will always apply its own law in the event that suit is brought there, see,
e.g., Wartell v. Formusa, 34 II1. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966), McSwain v.
McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966), the question is likely to arise in the
recovery state since the plaintiff can always bring suit there under that state's longarm act. In my view, the state where the accident occurs does not have a real
interest in applying its law in this situation because the social and economic
consequences of the accident will not be felt in that state. See notes 253-55 &
accompanying text infra. The courts of the accident state have for the most part,
however, seen it differently and have applied their own law. See cases cited in note
253 infra.
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and seeks to join the admittedly negligent husband as a third party
defendant in order to obtain contribution from him. While the law of
the state of injury would impose liability for contribution, contribution would not be permitted by the law of the spouses' home state,
since one spouse is immune from tort liability to the other. Should
the rule that spousal immunity is determined by the law of the
marital domicile apply here?' 8 6 Professor Reese concedes that it
should not, because of possible unfairness to the defendant who
resides in the accident state. 87 Thus, in order to avoid what Professor Reese considers to be an unfair result, the rule must be limited to
the question of immunity as between the spouses, and a new rule
must be developed to cover the contribution issue.
Even in cases involving only the spouses, however, Reese's
rule may be too broad. Suppose that the case involves not an
automobile accident but an intentional tort, so that the state of injury
has an interest in applying its law in order to implement the admonitory policy it reflects. 8 8 Reese's rule would presumably require that the state of injury subordinate its admonitory policy to the
immunity policy of the parties' home state. Such subordination,
however, would be inconsistent with Reese's other observation that,
"[tihe state where a person acts will almost certainly have the
greatest concern in the application of its tort rule relating to standards of conduct, provided that the act did not measure up to the
pertinent standard."' i 9 Is the rule that the law of the marital
domicile governs going to be further qualified by limiting it to the
situation where the tort arises out of an accident? Or are new rules
going to be proposed to determine what law applies in the case of
admonitory torts?
These examples suggest the problem inherent in any choice of
law rules. While the rule seems neat and simple at the outset, it
loses its simplicity when it runs up against the variety of fact-law
patterns and the different amalgams of policies and interests that
appear in actual cases. The notion that choice of law rules "greatly
facilitate the judicial task" 190 is extremely doubtful. In practice, it is
generally easier to decide cases on a case-by-case basis with reference to the policies and interests of the involved states than by the
186. For an "unthinking" application of the "rule" that the law of the domicile
determines spousal immunity, see Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d
130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959), to this situation, see Haynie v. Hanson, 16 Wis. 2d 299,
114 N.W.2d 443 (1962). With the abandonment of the spousal immunity "rule,"
Wisconsin, as the recovery state, has had no difficulty in applying its own law on
the contribution issue. See Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156
N.W.2d 466 (1968); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
187. Reese, Rules or Approach, supra note 9, at 321.
188. See Sedler, Characterization, supra note 93, at 67-68.
189. Reese, Rules or Approach, supra note 9, at 328.
190. Id. at 317.
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application of any rule, however narrow and policy-based it purports to be, to a variety of fact-law patterns.
If empirical demonstration is needed for this proposition, it can
be found in New York's experience with narrow, policy-based
rules. Prior to its decision in Neumeier v. Kuehner,'9 1 the New
York Court of Appeals had been following interest analysis, and
according to Reese, "because of the uncertainty and unpredictability it engendered," the court had been "deluged by appeals and
wracked by dissent."1 92 In Neumeier the court, in reaction to this
"uncertainty and unpredictability," and in reliance on the views of
Reese and other rule-oriented commentators,' 93 set forth rules governing choice of law in the guest statute situation, which could be
extended by analogy to most accident cases. 9 Under the Neumeier
rules, when the parties are from the same state, the law of that state
applies, and when they are from different states, the normally
applicable law is the law of the state where the accident occurred. 195
These rules seemed simple enough until the courts were called
upon to apply them in particular cases. In Rogers v. U-Haul Co. 196
a lower New York court was faced with the situation of an Alabama
resident killed in a Pennsylvania accident as a result of the negligence of a New York driver operating a vehicle owned by U-Haul, a
nationwide concern doing substantial business in New York. On the
issue of U-Haul's liability, the court applied the rule that the law of
191.

31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).

192. See note 85 & accompanying text supra.
193. 31 N.Y.2d at 127, 286 N.E.2d at 457, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
194. See Rogers v. U-Haul Co., 41 App. Div. 2d 834, 342 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1973);
Sedler, Interstate Accidents, supra note 61, at 135-37.
195. 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70. The "text" of
the rules is as follows:
(1) When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in
the same state, and the car is there registered, the law of that state should
control and determine the standard of care which the host owes to his
guest.
(2) When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile
and that state does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not
be held liable by reason of the fact that liability would be imposed upon him
under the tort law of the state of the victim's domicile. Conversely, when
the guest was injured in the state of his own domicile and its law permits
recovery, the driver who has come into that state should not-in the
absence of special circumstances-be permitted to interpose the law of his
state as a defense.
(3) In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are
domiciled in different states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of decision will be that of the state where the
accident occurred but not if it can be shown that displacing that normally
applicable rule will advance the relevant substantive law purposes without
impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or producing great
uncertainty for litigants.
In First National Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 447, 514 P.2d 314, 319 (1973), the
Colorado Supreme Court adopted the first two Neumeier rules.
196. 41 App. Div. 2d 834, 342 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1973).
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the state where the accident occurred governed when the parties
were from different states. Pennsylvania law imposed no vicarious
liability on U-Haul. Under New York law, however, U-Haul would
have been liable. Since, for purposes of tort liability, U-Haul would
be considered a New York defendant because of its substantial
business activity in that state, 197 if Alabama law would also have
imposed vicarious liability, in terms of interest analysis, the case
would have presented a false conflict. The court, however, did not
discuss Alabama law. Following the rule, it looked instead to the
law of Pennsylvania, which had no interest in having its law applied
on the point in issue, to the detriment of Alabama, which may have
had such an interest.
Such a false conflict clearly was presented in Chila v.
Owens, 198 a New York federal court case. The plaintiff was from
New Jersey and the defendant from New York, both recovery
states, while the accident occurred in Ohio, a guest statute state.
Because the parties were from different states, the normally applicable law under the Neumeier rules was the law of Ohio, where the
accident occurred. The court, however, treated the case as a false
conflict and assimilated it to the rule that directed the application of
the law of the parties' home state, even though the parties were
from different states. 9 Further confusion has been engendered by
the Second Circuit's decision in Rosenthal v. Warren,2°° where a
New York victim was killed in Massachusetts due to the negligence
of a Massachusetts defendant. Massachusetts law limited recovery
for wrongful death while New York law did not. Under the
Neumeier rules, Massachusetts law should have been applied, but
the Second Circuit, sitting as a New York state court, held that the
Neumeier rules did not apply to limitations on wrongful death
recovery because of New York's "strong public policy" against
limiting liability in such cases. 20 1 Thus, whatever else may be said
about the Neumeier rules, they certainly have not enhanced predictability or facilitated the judicial task in New York. 202 Indeed, not
197.
198.

Pahmer v. Hertz Corp., 36 App. Div. 2d 252, 319 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1971).
348 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).

199. The court also might have found the case to come within the third
Neumeier "exception." See note 195 supra.
200. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
201. The court relied on Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290
N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968), where the New York court, applying an "interest and fairness" test, applied New York law on the issue of limitations on wrongful death
recovery to an accident involving a New York victim and a Maine driver that
occurred in Maine. For a discussion of Miller in relation to the Neumeier rules, see
Sedler, Interstate Accidents, supra note 56, at 135-36.
202. For criticisms of the Neumeier rules, see Hancock, Some Choice of Law
Problems Posed by Antiguest Statutes: Realism in Wisconsin and Rule Fetishism in
New York, 27 STAN. L. REV. 775 (1975); Sedler, Interstate Accidents, supra note
57, at 130-42; Twerski, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 144, at 105; Trautman, Rule
or Reason in Choice of Law: A Comment on Neumeier, 1 VT. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1976).
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only do choice of law rules not facilitate the judicial task, but to the
contrary they put constraints on it, and force the courts to circumvent the rule in order to achieve what they consider to be sound
results in particular cases.
More significantly, the real alternatives are not choice of law
rules or no rules at all, as Professor Reese and the other rules
proponents have assumed, but choice of law rules versus rules of
choice of law. As I have discussed fully elsewhere,20 3 rules of
choice of law emerge from the decisions of the courts in actual cases
through the normal workings of binding precedent and stare decisis. Since conflicts cases tend to fall into certain fact-law patterns,
an analysis of the policies and interests of the involved states in a
particular case can be related to the fact-law pattern presented in
that case, and the decision can be applied directly or analogously to
another case presenting the same or a similar pattern.
As will be pointed out subsequently, in practice courts that
have abandoned the traditional approach generally make the choice
of law decision with reference to the policies and interests of the
involved states regardless of which approach to choice of law they
purport to follow. This practice appears most clearly in the tort area,
24
and has led to the development of clear rules of choice of law. 0
What is even more interesting is that in most situations the courts
agree on the preferred solution. For example, it is everywhere held
by policy-centered courts that when two forum residents are involved in an accident in another state , the law of the forum will
apply.2"5 Of almost equal universality is the rule of choice of law
that when two parties from a recovery state are involved in an
accident in a non-recovery state, recovery will be allowed. 2' Similarly, the courts are in agreement that the tort liability of an employer with respect to an employee who is covered by workmen's
compensation is determined by the law of the state where the
employer has taken out workmen's compensation to cover the
particular employee. 207
Interest analysis then, which is premised on case-by-case
determination, is not necessarily inconsistent with the development
of "rules" in the choice of law process. But the "rules" will be
rules of choice of law, based on the decisions of the courts in actual
203. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, note 3 supra.
204. See id. at -, 205. Id. at -, & cases cited therein.
206. Id. at -, & cases cited therein.

207. Id. As will be discussed subsequently, see notes 240-42 & accompanying
text infra, this also illustrates the situation where the employee's home state
concludes that it has no real interest in applying its law that allows additional

recovery.
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cases, not choice of law rules, formulated a priori and applied, as
best the courts are able, to the differing fact-law patterns that come
before them.

III.

CRITICISMS OF CURRIE'S SOLUTION TO THE TRUE CONFLICT

Currie's contention that in the case of a true conflict the forum
should apply its own law has been criticized on what may be called
methodological as well as policy grounds. There is disagreement
with Currie's assertion that the only rational way that a court can
resolve a true conflict is by the application of its own law, and it is
further contended that it is improper and unprincipled to resolve a
true conflict in this manner. These lines of criticism will be considered separately.
A.

Can a Court Resolve a True Conflict Other Than by the
Application of Its Own Law?
Currie's contention that the forum should apply its own law in
the case of the true conflict is based on the premises that courts lack
the resources to decide which interest should be required to yield
and that the determination of which state has the greater interest is a
"political function of a very high order that should not be committed to courts in a democracy. "08 Currie's critics dispute the contention that the forum cannot weigh conflicting interests by noting that
Currie says that in the case of the apparent conflict the court should
try to avoid the conflict by a "more moderate and restrained
interpretation" of the policy or interest of one state. If the court has
the resources to make that determination, they argue, it has them in
the case of the true conflict as well.' ° Both processes, in the view
of the critics, involve the weighing of interests, and to the extent
that Currie recognizes weighing of interests in one situation and not
in the other, interest analysis is found "internally inconsistent. "'21
Currie responds to this criticism by saying that the apparent
conflict and the true conflict are two very different situations. In the
case of the apparent conflict "reasonable men may differ whether a
conflicting interest should be asserted." A true conflict, on the
other hand, presents the situation where, "after careful analysis,
reasonable men tend to agree that neither court can, with fidelity to
the interest of its own state, defer to the interest of the other. "21
While there is a similarity between the analyses required in the two
situations, the difference in the objectives of those analyses seems
208.
209.
210.
211.
Verdict

See notes 49-51 & accompanying text supra.
Juenger, supra note 61, at 206-08; Traynor, supra note 44, at 855-61.
CAVERS, supra note 136, at 147-48; Traynor, supra note 44, at 855.
Currie, The DisinterestedThird State, supra note I, at 764. See also The
of Quiescent Years, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 603-06 (article originally

published at 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 258 (1961)).
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more significant than the similarity of their processes. Currie's
position is that it is proper for a court to try to avoid a true conflict,
but not to try to resolve a true conflict when it cannot be avoided.2 2
It is, thus, the distinction Currie draws as to the propriety of the
judicial goal in the two situations upon which criticism more properly should be focused.
It has been said that Currie's contention that the courts lack the
resources to resolve a true conflict is "equally applicable to a very
large percentage of our judge-made rules of law." 2' 13 The court's
responsibility, it is argued, is to decide the case before it; that the
legislature may be "better equipped to make the necessary judgment if it has not in fact done so" is irrelevant.2 14 Currie's proscription of interest-weighing, one critic concludes, "seems to strike at
the heart of the judicial process."25 Similarly, the critics reject the
argument that interest weighing requires the court to engage in a
political function. It is contended that interest weighing is no more
of a political function than sacrificing the forum's interests by a
more moderate and restrained interpretation of the forum's policy or
interest.216 It has also been said that the political function argument
is limited to "super-value" judgments, such as which law is the
"better law." 2 7 Finally, it is contended that the court may resolve a
true conflict by redefining interests and looking to the forum's
"broader governmental interest" instead of to its interest in applying a particular rule of substantive law. Recognition of these
"broader interests" may dictate displacement of the forum's own
substantive law, and thus the true conflict in effect will be avoid-

ed.218
Here the critics would seem to have the better of the argument.
Courts can resolve true conflicts by using what resources are at
hand. To call such action a political function is but another way of
saying that the courts should prefer their own policy or interest. It is
not an independent reason for a court to refuse to resolve a true
conflict. Currie's antipathy toward choosing one interest over
another may be minimized once it is recognized that the true
conflict can be resolved by means other than determining which
state has the "greater interest." Other theorists have developed
solutions for the true conflict that generally are not based on interest
weighing. They are based instead on considerations relating to the
212. In the reformulation of interest analysis, the matter of a "more moderate
and restrained interpretation" will be subsumed in the determination of the forum's
real interest in applying its own law.
213. Baxter, supra note 44, at 21.
214. Id. at 22.
215. Traynor, supra note 44, at 853.
216. Hill, supra note 8, at 475-77.
217. Baxter, supra note 44, at 22; Horowitz, supra note 44, at 753.
218. Hill, supra note 8, at 492.
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needs of the federal system, the nature of the laws involved,
expectations of the parties and the like. These solutions have been
embodied in comprehensive methodologies that have been fully set
forth by their proponents;" 9 it is not necessary to discuss them here.
Some of these methodologies build largely on interest analysis
while others include it to a lesser extent. All, however, propose
solutions to the true conflict, other than the application of the
forum's own law, which do not require the court to engage in
interest-weighing or to determine which state has the greater interest. It, thus, appears that Currie has overstated the case for forum
law in the true conflict situation. His argument that a court cannot
resolve true conflicts by means other than application of the forum's
law has been refuted effectively by the development of these alternative solutions.
B.

Is It Improperfor a Court to Resolve a True Conflict Solely by
the Application of Its Own Law?
Assuming that a court can resolve a true conflict by means
other than the application of its own law, the question remains
whether it should do so. Critics of Currie's position with respect to
the resolution of true conflict assert that the forum's preference for
its own law would in many instances be "lawlessness of a high
order," 220 and would "encourage forum shopping. "221 It would
also require disregard of policies other than those reflected in the
substantive laws of the involved states, which it is said, ignores the
possible disappearance in the multistate context, of policies that
may be applicable in the purely domestic setting.222
Professor Von Mehren has also leveled the charge that Currie's
approach to the resolution of the true conflict is unprincipled. The
219. For a discussion of functional analysis, see generally R. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY

ON

THE

CONFLICT

OF

LAWS

(1971)

[hereinafter

cited

as

(The Weintraub approach is summarized in CRAMTON, CURRIE &
KAY, supra note 1, at 362-64); D. TRAUTMAN & A. VON MEHREN, THE LAW OF
MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965) (The Trautman and von Mehren approach is summarized in CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY, supra note 1, at 359-62).
For a discussion of comparative impairment, see Baxter, note 44 supra. After
his seminal article, Professor Baxter left the field of conflicts for other academic
pursuits. See also Horowitz, note 44 supra.
For a discussion of Cavers' principles of preference, see CAVERS, note 136
supra. This approach is summarized in CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY, supra note 1, at
326-33.
For a discussion of Leflar's choice-influencing considerations, see R. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW, ch. 11 (1968); Leflar, Choice Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966); Leflar, More on ChoiceInfluencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966). Leflar's approach is
summarized in CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY, supra note 1, at 313-16. Solutions to the
true conflict are also proposed by Professor Shapira. SHAPIRA, supra note 64, at
181-98.
220. Rosenberg, supra note 74, at 468.
221. Couch, supra note 148, at 15. See also Baxter, supra 44, at 9-10.
222. von Mehren, Recent Trends, supra note 72, at 937.
WEINTRAUB].
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principled application of rules of law, says Von Mehren, requires
that similar treatment be accorded "equivalent patterns of value and
purpose;"221 thus forum preference in the case of the true conflict is
unprincipled because it applies to one case a rule that it is not
prepared to generalize for all analogous cases.
These criticisms of Currie's view as to the proper resolution of
the true conflict, rather than coming to grips with the question of
why the forum should refuse to apply its own law when it has an
interest in doing so, simply assume the validity of their own premises. It is not "lawless" for the forum to apply its own law when
this does not produce fundamental unfairness to either of the parties,
unless it is assumed that the only "lawful" solution is to employ
some other means of resolution. Nor has any demonstration been
made as to why "forum-shopping" for a more favorable law is
undesirable. If two states are involved with the parties and the
transaction in question, each of which constitutionally may apply its
own law, and one of which allows the plaintiff to recover, there is
nothing improper in the plaintiff's suing in the state allowing recovery and in obtaining recovery under its law.224 Such an outcome is
improper only if it is assumed that the result should not differ
depending on where the suit is brought, and that alleged uniformity
is worth the price of sacrificing forum interests.
Similarly, to fault Currie's resolution of the true conflict because it does not take into account policies other than those reflected
in the substantive law of the forum also begs the question. It
assumes that these other policies are entitled to be given great
weight in a conflicts case, but does not explain why they are to be
given more weight than the forum's interest in advancing the policy
reflected in its substantive law. Since the essential premise of
interest analysis is that choice of law decisions should be made with
reference to the policies and interests of the involved states, the
application of the forum's law in the case of the true conflict cannot
be faulted for failing to take into account other policies that are not
considered germane in light of that essential premise.
As to the charge that Currie's approach to the resolution of the
true conflict is unprincipled, what is or is not principled depends on
the formulation of the underlying principle. It is unprincipled to
apply the forum's law in the case of the true conflict only if the
underlying principle is that the same case should not be decided
differently depending on where suit is brought. On the other hand, if
223. Id. at 941-43. Professor von Mehren notes, however, that in an "imperfect community'--one that lacks a common legislature and judiciary-principled
results in this sense are difficult to attain in practice, because "each of the involved
legal orders hesitates to adopt principled solutions for fear that the others will be
less principled." Id. at 943.
224. See notes 264-67 & accompanying text infra.
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the underlying principle is that courts should adopt a uniform
approach to conflicts cases, Currie's resolution is most principled in
that it advocates that each forum should apply its own law in the
case of the true conflict.
The critics, it is submitted, have not demonstrated why it is
necessarily improper for the forum to resolve the true conflict by the
application of its own law. At the same time, alternatives to the
resolution of the true conflict other than by the application of the
forum's own law exist which are not inconsistent with the premises
on which interest analysis is based. Thus, the basic question is
which approach to the resolution of the true conflict will achieve
sound and fair results in practice, and will best accommodate the
interests of all states in the context of conflicts litigation. It is my
contention that in the case of the true conflict the forum should
apply its own law, although my reasons for this view are to some
extent different from those advanced by Currie. This submission
will be developed fully in section IV.
IV.
A.

A REFORMULATION OF CURRIE'S GOVERNMENTAL APPROACH
The Need for a Reformulation
As has been noted, Currie's governmental interest approach
was developed against the background of the rigid, territoriallybased rules of the original Restatement and was designed to present
a wholly new approach to choice of law. It was formulated as an
academic approach, having as its objective the identification and
resolution of interest situations and was not directed as such toward
assisting the courts in deciding the cases that come before them. As
formulated by Currie, interest analysis may seem unduly complex
to the courts, and particularly in view of Currie's proposed solutions, may call for unnecessary steps when it is being applied by the
courts in the process of deciding actual cases.
Moreover, in determining interests, Currie's methodology
focused on possible or hypothetical interests, the initial inquiry
being directed toward whether both of the involved states had such
interests in applying their laws. If both states appeared to have such
an interest, Currie saw the case as presenting an apparent conflict.
At this point in Currie's methodology, it was necessary for the
forum to reexamine the respective policies and interests of the
involved states, and to ask whether a more moderate and restrained
interpretation of the policy or interests of one of the states could
avoid the conflict.2 25 It was this aspect of Currie's methodology that
caused considerable confusion and criticism. 226 Whether such
225. See notes 46-47 & accompanying text supra.
226. See notes 209-10 & accompanying text supra.
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confusion is warranted or not, 2 2 7 the fact that it exists impairs the
effectiveness of Currie's methodology, particularly for use by the
courts.
Secondly, while for academic purposes it is necessary to distinguish between false conflicts and true conflicts, the distinction
need not trouble the courts: In either situation Currie advocates that
the forum should apply its own law. Analysis of these two situations, as well as the matter of a "more moderate and restrained
interpretation" of the forum's policy or interest can be subsumed
in one test: looking to real interests.22
The matter of real interests lies at the heart of my reformulation
of Currie's governmental interest approach. The crucial question for
the forum court in a conflicts case should be whether the forum has
a real interest in applying its own law in order to implement the
policy reflected in that law. When the forum decides that it does
have a real interest in applying its own law, it has necessarily
determined that any conflict between its policy and interest and
those of another state cannot be avoided by a "more moderate and
restrained interpretation" of its own policy or interest. It is only if
and when the forum has concluded that it has no real interest in
applying its own law that it should be concerned about the policy
and interest of the other state .229 In order words, the interests of the
forum and of the other involved state should be
considered indepen2 30
dently in making the choice of law decision.
This reformulation of Currie's methodology of interest analysis 231 would eliminate, as far as the courts applying it would be
concerned, 23 2 the categories of false conflicts, apparent conflicts
and true conflicts. It would not affect as such the unprovided-for
case. The interest situations, then, would be: (1) the situation
where the forum has a real interest in applying its own law (the true
conflict, and the false conflict where the forum is the only interested
state); (2) the situation where the forum does not have a real interest
in applying its own law, but the other involved state does (the false
227. See notes 211-12 & accompanying text supra.
228. For an earlier discussion of the difference between real and hypothetical
interests, see Sedler, Symposium-Conflict of Laws Round Table: The Value of
PrincipledPreferences, 49 TEX. L. REV. 224, 225 (1971).
229. This will substantially reduce the number of cases in which the forum will
have to be concerned with the policy and interest of the other involved state.
230. As to the relevance of the "obvious interest" of the other involved state
when the forum is determining its own real interest, see note 236 & accompanying
text infra.
231. This reformulation is designed to do much more than redefine Currie's
interest situations. Essentially it is designed to separate the determination of the
forum's policy and interest from the determination of the policy and interest of the
other involved state and to make the choice of law decision depend primarily on the
forum's determination of its own policy and interest.
232. 1 think that Currie's original formulation is still extremely useful for
teaching purposes.
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conflict brought in the disinterested state); and (3) the unprovidedfor case (where neither state has an interest).
It should be noted, of course, that in any choice of law case,
considerations of fairness to the parties is an independent value. A
court will not make a choice of law decision that would be fundamentally unfair to either or both parties. 233 Even possible unfairness
to the parties should influence the choice of law decision. 23 4 As will
be demonstrated, however, in most cases where the forum has a real
interest in applying its law on the point in issue, the application of
its law will not be fundamentally unfair. Conversely, the same
factors that would produce possible unfairness in the application of
a state's law often will also indicate the lack of a real interest in
applying that law. In practice, fairness to the parties generally has
not been a problem, but where appropriate, the courts have carefully considered the fairness question and have pointed out why no
unfairness results from their choice of law decision in the particular
case.
The matter of determining whether the forum has a real interest
will be examined at length. My views as to why the forum should
apply its own law whenever it has a real interest in doing so and as
to how the unprovided-for case should be resolved will be discussed
next. Finally, certain other aspects of interest analysis that
appear significant in light of this formulation will be examined.
B.

The Matter of Determining the Forum's Real Interest
In determining whether the forum has a real interest in the
application of its law on the point in issue, the court essentially must
decide whether the policy behind the forum's rule will be significantly advanced by its application to a situation containing a foreign
element.23 5 In the process of answering that question the court is
necessarily aware of what may be called the "obvious interest" of
another state when such an interest is present. For example, when
two parties from a non-recovery state are involved in an accident in
a recovery state and suit is brought in the recovery state, it is
obvious that the parties' home state is interested in applying its law
on the point in issue, since the consequences of imposing liability
will be felt there. That factor may influence the forum in deciding
whether the policy reflected in its law allowing recovery will be
233. By "fundamental unfairness," I mean such unfairness that comes close to
being a due process violation. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See
also notes 312-18 & accompanying text infra.
234. See note 237 & accompanying text infra.
235. Some aspects of the comparative impairment principle relate to avoiding a
true conflict rather than to resolving it, and these aspects may be useful in determining whether the policy behind the forum's rule will be significantly advanced by its
application in the particular case. See Horowitz, supra note 44, at 726, 739-41, 744,
749-50, 753-54.
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significantly advanced in the case, but it is a secondary factor that
should not obscure the forum's concern with its own policy and
interest.236 Similarly, the possible unfairness to the parties resulting
from the application of the forum's law may come into play, but
again only in the context of deciding the "significantly advanced"
question. The point to be emphasized is that the focus is on whether
the policy behind the forum's law will be significantly advanced by
its application to this situation containing a foreign element; other
considerations are relevant only insofar as they assist in the resolution of this question.23 7
It was earlier demonstrated that ordinarily it is not difficult to
determine the policies behind a state's law and the interest of a
state, in light of those policies, in applying its law to a particular
situation containing a foreign element.238 The interests toward
which that discussion was directed should be viewed as real interests for our present purposes, and the criteria outlined there as
criteria for the determination of real interests. Thus, a state has a
real interest in applying its law when,
the reasons or governmental interests behind the state's
policy are such that the state has a logical, rational, legitimate cause to apply its policy to the case in question...
because the local elements of the case-the parties, the
subject matter, the transaction, the accident, the injurybear a rational relationship to the reasons and interests
behind the policy of the state.2 3 9
The matter of determining the forum's real interest can perhaps
be demonstrated most clearly by a consideration of cases in which
the forum concluded that it did not have an interest in applying its
own law because the policy reflected in that law would not be
significantly advanced. These cases prove that application of the
forum's own law does not necessarily follow from use of interest
analysis, and further demonstrate how the concept of real interest
operates to identify those situations where the forum will not apply
its own law.
236. However, as Currie noted, the court "must reckon with the fact that an
immoderate and provincial determination may lead to a serious conflict with the
policies and interests of a foreign state." The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of
the Romero Case, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 370 (article originally published at 27
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1959)). "And it is clear that the courts of a state may properly
take into account the possibility of conflict with the interests of other states in
determining what domestic policy is and how far domestic interests extend."
UnconstitutionalDiscriminationin the Conflict of Laws: Privilegesand Immunities,
in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 498 (article originally published at 69 YALE L.J. 1323
(1960)).
237. Again, my purpose is to make the choice of law decision depend primarily
on the forum's determination of its own policy and interest.
238. See notes 90-129 & accompanying text supra.
239. Kramer, supra note 119, at 532.
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One series of cases in which the forum has uniformly held that
its own law was inapplicable involves tort claims of injured employees against employers who have attempted to cover work-related
injuries by workers' compensation. Conflicts problems arise when
the employment relationship is connected with more than one state,
the laws of which differ on the question of whether the employee
can maintain a common law tort action against a particular employer. In Wilson v. Faull,2 4 for example, a New Jersey employee of a
sub-contractor was injured while working in Pennsylvania due to
the negligence of the general contractor. Pennsylvania law required
general contractors to take out workmen's compensation to cover
employees of sub-contractors and immunized general contractors
from tort liability to, such employees. Under New Jersey law,
however, general contractors were not required to cover employees
of sub-contractors, and correspondingly, were subject to tort liability. The New Jersey court held its law inapplicable and sustained the
employer's defense to tort liability under Pennsylvania law.
Under the law of New Jersey, as well as Pennsylvania, workrelated injuries generally were dealt with by workers' compensation. The plaintiff in Wilson had recovered workers' compensation
from the sub-contractor, so the basic policy of New Jersey that
work-related injuries should be compensated had been satisfied as to
his recovery. While New Jersey and Pennsylvania differed over the
availability of additional compensation by way of tort liability,
provisions for such additional compensation constituted a narrow
segment of New Jersey's policy with respect to work-related injuries. Thus, New Jersey's basic policy would in no way be impaired if additional compensation were not awarded in such a case.
Moreover, the employer had complied with Pennsylvania law requiring that he cover the particular employee by workers' compensation and, in turn, relied on Pennsylvania law to give him immunity from tort liability to such employees. While the possible unfairness in denying the employer the benefit of Pennsylvania law might
be relevant in determining whether New Jersey had a real interest in
applying its law here, more to the point is the fact that the employer
(as well as the sub-contractor) was required to take out worker's
compensation to cover the particular employee, thus satisfying New
Jersey's basic policy as to employer liability.
Wilson is illustrative of the courts' uniform practice. When an
employee seeks to recover in tort for work-related injuries, the
courts look to the law of the state where the employer has taken out
workers' compensation to cover the employee. 24 ' Where the
forum's law allows additional compensation, but the law of the
240. 27 N.J. 105, 141 A.2d 768 (1958).
241. See Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 3, at

-.
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workers' compensation state does not, the courts have concluded
242
that the forum has no real interest in applying its own law.
A case where a California court refused to apply California law
to a situation containing a foreign element further illustrates the
operation of the real interest test. In an automobile forfeiture proceeding, a California statute requiring the holder of a security
interest in an automobile to make a "reasonable investigation" into
the character of the purchaser was held inapplicable to a transaction
occurring in Texas, notwithstanding that the automobile was subsequently seized in California while being used for the unlawful
transportation of narcotics. 243 The court emphasized that it would be
unfair to require the Texas security holder to conform his behavior
to the California standard when acting in a state some distance
away.24' As this consideration related to the determination of real
interests, it also demonstrated that California's policy with respect
to requiring a "reasonable investigation" would not be significantly
impaired if it did not apply to the very rare situation where the
automobile was purchased in another state some distance away,
subsequently taken into California and used for an unlawful purpose
there. Thus, California had no real interest in applying its law to this
situation containing a foreign element.
In another case 245 a California resident solicited a finder's fee
by sending a letter to an officer of a New York-based corporation,
advising him that a California-based company might be for sale and
that he should reply if interested. The defendant did not reply, but
did eventually acquire the California company. The plaintiff sued in
California, alleging that under California law, he was entitled to
recover reasonable compensation if the defendant took advantage of
the "tip." Under the New York statute of frauds, the defendant
would not be liable. The court observed that while New York had a
"clear" interest in applying its law to protect its resident defendant
from liability, California's interest in applying its law to allow
recovery was "much less apparent.,24 The policy behind California law awarding reasonable compensation for making use of tips
242. In practice the courts do not distinguish between the situation where the
employee is a forum resident and the situations where the employee is a nonresident.
243. People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal.2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957).
244. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal.

Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976). If the defendant's place of business
was located in close proximity to California, as in Bernhard, there would be a
greater likelihood that his failure to make a "reasonable investigation" would result
in automobiles being used for an illegal purpose in California. In that situation
California's policy might be significantly impaired if it were not applied to the
defendant's activity, and the proximity of that activity to California would make the
application of California law clearly reasonable.
245. Denny v. American Tobacco Co., 308 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1970).

246.

Id. at 223.

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25: 181

would not be impaired if it was not applied to the situation where
there were no dealings between the parties, such as where a nonresident defendant made no response to an initiative of a California
plaintiff. 24 7 Again, California had no real interest in applying its law
to this particular situation containing a foreign element.
A final example of the lack of a real interest on the part of the
forum is In re Estate of Clark .248 There the question was whether a
New York statute authorizing a testator to provide that the validity
and effect of testamentary dispositions with respect to movables
situated in New York be governed by New York law, was applicable to bar the right of the surviving spouse to take against the will.
Such a right was recognized by the law of the marital domicile, but,
in the circumstances presented, would not be recognized by New
York. The statute reflected New York's policy of encouraging
parties to deposit property in New York banks by enabling them to
make an express choice of law .249 Normally, however, the right of a
spouse to take against the will is governed by the law of the marital
domicile. 250 Thus this obvious interest of the domicile was relevant
in determining whether the New York statute should apply.25 The
court concluded that New York's policy of encouraging out-ofstaters to deposit property in New York banks would not be significantly impaired if it did not apply to so fundamental a question as
the right of the spouse to take against the will, and held the statute
inapplicable. In effect it was saying that New York had no real
interest in applying its law on the question of whether a non-resident
spouse has the right to take against the will with respect to movable
property situated in New York.
As these cases demonstrate, courts will generally determine
their own interests and the scope of their own policy with restraint
and moderation, and will not apply their own law where they
conclude that the policy reflected in that law will not be significantly advanced by its application in the circumstances presented.
This does not mean that courts will always agree on what constitutes
a real interest, any more than they will always agree on any other
247. If the defendant had responded to the solicitation, there is greater likelihood that California would have found that it had a real interest in applying its law
here, and it would not have mattered that under New York law the defendant could
not incur liability by taking advantage of the tip, By the same token, such response
would have removed any question of possible unfairness in the application of
California law. See Cook Associates v. Colonial Broach & Mach. Co., 14 Ill. App.
3d 965, 304 N.E.2d 27 (1973).
248. 21 N.Y.2d 478, 236 N.E.2d 152, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1968).
249. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d
233 (1965).
250. 21 N.Y.2d at 486-87, 236 N.E.2d at 156-57, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 999-1000.
251. This is what is meant by a consideration of the "obvious interest" of the
other involved state in the determination of the forum's own real interest. See notes
236-37 & accompanying text supra.
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question. For example, when two parties from a non-recovery state
are involved in an accident in a recovery state, and suit is brought in
the recovery state,252 the courts have disagreed on the preferred
result, with the majority coming down in favor of the application of
their own law allowing recovery.253 Sometimes courts that have
applied their own law in this situation justly can be accused of
"straining" to find an interest.254 On the whole, however, the
courts have not applied 255
their own law when they have not seen a
real interest in doing so.
C.

The Application of the Forum's Law to
Implement Its Real Interest
Once the forum determines that it has a real interest in applying
its law the court should apply it, without considering whether any
other involved state also has a real interest in the application of its
own law. 256 The primary reason for my advocating such application
of forum law is my view that in a conflict case the proper function
of a court is to advance its own policies and interests rather than to
advance "multistate policies." Whenever the forum has decided
that it has a real interest in the application of its law, it has
necessarily concluded that the policy behind the law would be
significantly impaired if it were not applied to this particular situation containing a foreign element. It is clearly legitimate for a court
to decide that the implementation of that policy is more important
than implementation of "multistate policies;" courts simply do not
view their function in a conflicts case to be that of "policing the
interstate and international legal order." In practice, courts tend to
see a conflicts case as essentially a domestic case with a foreign
element added; when the same reasons that call for the application
of their law in a domestic case are equally present in a conflicts
case, they naturally enough want to apply their own law. The
validity of this approach, it is submitted, must be tested with
reference to the results it produces in actual litigation. The following examination of cases illustrates that the approach produces what
may be considered to be sound and fair results, and thus cannot be
faulted because it prefers the forum's real interest over "multistate
concerns."
252.

As it generally can be under that state's long-arm act.

253. See Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 3, at

-.

254. See note 131 & accompanying text supra.

255. Interestingly enough, some commentators who have advanced alternative
solutions to the true conflict advocate application of the law of the state of injury in
this situation. See CAVERS, supra note 136, at 139-45; Hancock, supra note 202, at
781-82; Trautman, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 COLuM. L. REv. 468, 469-

72 (1967).
256.

It should be reiterated that considerations of fairness to the parties ordi-

narily have been subsumed in the real interest test. See notes 243-47 & accompanying text supra.
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In tort cases in which the plaintiff is from a recovery state and
the defendant from a non-recovery state, a true conflict is necessarily presented irrespective of where the accident occurs, since the
'social and economic consequences of allowing or denying recovery
will be felt in both the parties' home states. The plaintiff's home
state has a real interest in applying its law to provide compensation
for its injured resident while the defendant's home state has a real
interest in protecting its resident defendant and insurer from liability. When the suit has been brought in the defendant's home state, it
has always applied its law to deny recovery.257 However, when the
suit has been brought in the plaintiff's home state (where it frequently can be brought although the accident occurred in the defendant's
25 9
home state or another non-recovery state),2' with few exceptions
that state has applied its own law irrespective of where the accident
occurred, 260 and even if the accident was not factually connected
257. See note 291 infra.
258. Where the injury occurs in the defendant's home state, long-arm act
jurisdiction is not ordinarily available in the plaintiff's home state. But it may be
available if the circumstances leading up to the accident had factual connections
with that state, even though the accident itself occurred elsewhere, as in Foster v.
Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972). The defendant may be an enterprise doing
business in the plaintiff's state, so that jurisdiction can be obtained on that basis. In
New York jurisdiction can be obtained by attaching the obligation to defend of the
non-resident's insurer, which is likely to be doing business in New York, under
Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). See
Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
Assuming that Seider is still constitutional after Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S.Ct. 2569
(1977), see O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977),
the New York plaintiff injured elsewhere then will probably be able to sue in New
York. On the other hand, assuming that the rationale of Shaffer renders unconstitutional the exercise of in personam jurisdiction on the basis of personal service
alone, it will no longer be possible for the nominal defendant in the guest statute
situation to arrange to be served in the plaintiff's home state, as occurred in Cipolla
v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
259. The exceptions to this practice in recent years are as follows: Barrett v.
Foster Grant Co., 450 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1971), where, as will be discussed at note
267 infra, a question of fairness may have been involved; Pryor v. Swarner, 445
F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1971), where a federal court applying New York conflicts law,
and anticipating the Neumeier rules, which had been previewed in Judge Fuld's
concurring opinion in Tooker, did not apply New York Law allowing recovery in
favor of a New York guest passenger injured by a host-driver from a guest statute
state in a guest statute state; and Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854
(1970), where, as I have discussed elsewhere, see Sedler, Territorial Imperative,
supra note 160, at 401-02, "territorial hang-ups" may have caused the forum to
refuse to apply its law when the accident was connected entirely with the state of
injury.
In Casey v. Manson Const. & Eng'r Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967), the
Oregon court failed to apply Oregon law allowing recovery for loss of consortium in
favor of an Oregon plaintiff whose spouse was injured by a Washington defendant
in Washington. The present authority of that case has subsequently been questioned, however, see Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608, 611-12 (9th Cir.
1975), and it might not be followed today.
260. See Turcotte v, Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974); Rosenthal v.
Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973); Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972);
Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways, 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974);
Schneider v. Nicholas, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Miller v. Miller, 22
N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
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26
with the forum. '

The application of the forum's law in the accident situation,
whether to allow or to deny recovery, produces sound results in that

a forum is never called upon to sacrifice, but rather can always
advance, its own real interests. While the outcome will depend on

where suit is brought, this in no sense detracts from the soundness
of the result. In the first place, suit cannot be maintained in the
plaintiff's home state unless the defendant has sufficient minimum

contacts with that state to make its exercise of jurisdiction rea-

sonable.26 2 Second, while uniformity of result is not achieved, it has

long been recognized that under any approach to choice of law,

uniformity of result is a practical impossibility; 263 advancement of
the forum's real interests should not be sacrificed in the search for
an illusory uniformity. 26 Third, when two states are involved with
the parties and the transaction in question, each of which constitutionally may apply its own law, and one of which allows the

plaintiff to recover, it is not unreasonable to permit the plaintiff to
go into 26the
state that allows recovery and to obtain recovery under
5
its law.
Moreover, the application of forum law in tort cases, whichever the forum, is not likely to produce any unfairness to either party.
In tort cases unfairness in the application of the law of a particular
state can result only if a party could not foresee being held liable
under the standard set forth in the law of that state and so could not
be expected to insure against it, 266 or if a party relied on the law of
261. As in Rosenthal, Miller and Turcotte.
262. See note 258 supra.
263. As was true even when all courts were following the traditional approach,
both because of genuine disagreement as to the correct application of the choice of
law rules and because of the use of manipulative techniques. See Sedler, Babcock
v. Johnson in Kentucky, supra note 4, at 48-49.
264. As Currie has put it, the sacrifice of the forum's interests "seems an
extravagant price to pay for uniformity of result-the more so since the attainment
of that goal is in fact problematical." Married Women's Contracts: A Study in
Conflict-of-Laws Method, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 101 (article originally published at 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958)).
265. An analogy may be drawn here to the German practice of applying the law
most favorable to the plaintiff in tort cases where the act and harm occur in
different states. See 2 E. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 135 (2d ed. 1968); U.
DROBNIG, AMERICAN-GERMAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw,213-14 (1972).
266. Thus in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976), there was no unfairness in
subjecting the Nevada tavern-keeper to the California standard, since the tavernkeeper's place of business was located close to the California state line and he
solicited California customers. It was foreseeable that an intoxicated customer
could cause an accident in California, which is what happened in that case. The
same rationale justifies the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over the out-of-state
manufacturer whose products cause injury in the forum. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler
Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal.2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rvtr. 113 (1969); Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 III. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761

(1961).
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another state and conformed its conduct to the requirements of that
law in circumstances where it was reasonable for that party to do
2 7
SO. 1

The absence of unfairness in applying the law of the plain-

tiff's home state to allow recovery even though the accident occurred in the defendant's home state and was not factually connected with the plaintiff's home state is illustrated by Miller v. Miller. 68 In that case, a fatal accident occurred in Maine involving a
New York victim and a Maine defendant. Maine limited the amount

recoverable for wrongful death; New York did not. Suit was
brought in New York, where the defendant subsequently had
moved.269 In holding that there would be no unfairness in applying

New York law on the issue of limited liability for wrongful death,
the court noted that the defendant's liability insurance policy covered out-of-state accidents, and that insurance policies do not distinguish between liability for personal injuries and liability for wrong-

ful death. Thus, the defendant and the insurer could have expected
to be held to unlimited liability, 270 and would not be prejudiced by
being held to that standard merely27 because the accident occurred in
Maine rather than in New York.
267. This may have been the situation in Barrett v. Foster Grant Co., 450 F.2d
1146 (lst Cir. 1971). There the plaintiff, a resident of New Hampshire and an
employee of a New Hampshire contractor, was injured while working on land in
Massachusetts owned by a corporation having its principal place of business there.
Suit was brought in a federal court in New Hampshire, where the defendant was
also doing business. Under Massachusetts law a landowner owed the same duty of
care to employees of independent contractors as was owed to other invitees on the
land, and that duty was not breached here. It was contended that under New
Hampshire law the landowner owed a higher duty of care to employees of independent contractors while working on the land. The court held that Massachusetts law
applied on the issue of duty of care. It can be said that here the defendant
conformed its conduct to the standard required by Massachusetts law at least in the
sense that a landowner, being generally familiar with the requirements of that
state's law, would not expect to be required to take special precautions because an
employee of an independent contractor was on the land. Thus, it would be fundamentally unfair to hold it to a different standard. As the court noted:
Nothing is more fixed than land, and hence, at least initially, the duties
resulting from ownership. If the law of the residence of the visitor were to
control, a landowner would be obliged to think in terms of the law of fifty
states, not to mention foreign countries. Predictability does not point to the
place of origin of the visitor. We believe in any broad sense it points
directly to where the land from which the duty arose is located.
Id. at 1152.
268. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
269. Although the New York court talked about post-accident changes in
residence, it is difficult to seriously believe that the result would have been any
different if the defendant was still a Maine resident at the time of the suit, particularly since the accident would be charged to the insurer's Maine loss experience in
either circumstance.
270. As Professor Weintraub has demonstrated most clearly, insurers are not
unfairly surprised by being held to liability under the law of a particular state.
WEINTRAUB, supra note 219, at 205-06.
271. Moreover, the insurer was doing business in New York, and it would not
be unfair for the New York courts, under a "benefit theory" to hold the insurer to
the New York standard of liability whenever a New York resident was injured in
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In contracts cases too, the forum generally has applied its own
law once it concluded that it had a real interest in doing so, and in
such cases the application of forum law produced no unfairness to

the parties. For example, the state having an interest in applying the
regulatory policy reflected in its insurance law will do so regardless
of other factors that may be present in the case. 2 72 Similarly, the
state having a policy designed to protect certain classes of persons

from liability on contracts will apply that policy in favor of its
resident defendants. 273
In contract cases, there must be greater concern for possible

unfairness because of the possibility that the parties may have
justifiably relied on the law of a particular state in entering into the
contract. However, where the contract is so connected with a
particular state that it may be assumed that the parties relied on that
state's law, another state usually will have no real interest in

applying its law to regulate that contract. Nor does unfairness result
when a state applies its policy designed to protect certain classes of
persons from liability on contracts in favor of its resident who has
entered into a contract elsewhere. Application of the law of the

party's home state on this issue could have been foreseen by the
other party at the time of entering into the contract. For example, in
Potlatch No. I Federal Credit Union v. Kennedy,27 4 the Washington court applied Washington law to protect a Washington marital
community from liability on a contract entered into in Idaho by the
husband. The court noted that the Idaho creditor had known that he
was dealing with residents of Washington and could have foreseen

the application of Washington community property law to any claim
he might assert against the community. 275

A second reason for my advocating application of forum law
whenever the forum has a real interest is that such application is the
another state by a vehicle that the company had insured. See Sedler, Territorial
Imperative, supra note 160, at 406-07.
272. See, e.g., Haines v. Mid-Century Life Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177
N.W.2d 328 (1970); Sedler, Contracts Provisions, supra note 63, at 312-14.
273. See Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964); Potlatch No. I
Fed. Credit Union v. Kennedy, 76 Wash. 2d 806, 459 P.2d 32 (1969). The only
exception in this area has been in regard to claims of usury, and some courts still
apply a "rule of validity," even though this subverts the policy contained in its law
that imposes strict sanctions for usury. See Sedler, Contracts Provisions, supra
note 58, at 315-27.
274. 76 Wash. 2d 806, 459 P.2d 32 (1969). In a case such as Lilienthal v.
Kaufman, 239 Or. I, 395 P.2d 543 (1964), there is no unfairness in applying the law
of a party's home state on the question of incompetency, since one party to a
transaction always takes the risk that the other party may turn out to be incompetent. The party can be expected to know where the other party resides, and in
Lilienthal, if a credit check had been run in Oregon, the defendant's incompetency
likely would have been revealed. See the discussion of this point in Currie, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. REV. 595, 603-04 (1968).
275. 76 Wash. 2d at 813, 459 P.2d at 37.
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most effective and rational way to accommodate conflicting state
interests. While this statement may seem paradoxical, it reflects the
realities of conflicts litigation and. of the behavior of the courts in
practice. Stated bluntly, when courts have purported to apply "objective criteria" to the resolution of a true conflict, they have
skewed the criteria in favor of the application of their own law. 276
Recognition of the realities and of the dynamics of judicial behavior
in the context of conflicts litigation leads to the conclusion that the
best way to accommodate conflicting state interests is by the
straightforward application of the law of the forum whenever it has
a real interest in doing so. Such straightforward application will
produce more comprehensible results than will attempts to resolve
true conflicts by "objective criteria." Moreover, advancement of
the interests of the different states will to an extent even out, since
each state will have occasion to advance its own policies and
interests in some cases. 277

The skewing of "objective criteria" is most clearly demonstrated by the fact that courts, with few exceptions, have applied

forum law whenever a real interest in doing so existed; this is true
278
regardless of the approach that the court is purportedly following.
276. As Professor Baxter has observed in arguing that the federal courts rather
than the state courts should be determining the proper "sphere of application" of
conflicting state laws:
The courts of each state are active participants in the formulation and
implementation of local policies. To place in their hands extensive responsibility for deciding when those policies will yield to and when they will
prevail over the competing policies of sister states seems unsound.
Baseball's place as the favorite American pastime would not long survive if
the responsibilities of the umpire were transferred to the first team member
who managed to rule on a disputed event.
BAXTER, supra note 44, at 23.
277. However, since suit often can be brought in the state that has a real
interest in applying its law in favor of the plaintiff, the balance will be struck in
favor of the states whose laws on the whole protect plaintiffs. But the same state
may have some rules of law that are plaintiff-oriented and other rules of law that are
defendant-oriented, e.g., a state may recognize comparative negligence, but may
also have a guest statute.
278. Courts that purport to follow the Restatement Second's most significant
relationship approach tend to emphasize the policy considerations outlined in § 6.
These considerations include the "relevant policies of the forum [and the] other
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue." RESTATEM ET (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 (1971). Such

courts tend to find that on the issue in question, their state is the state of the most
significant relationship. See, e.g., Haines v. Mid-Century Life Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 2d
442, 177 N.W.2d 328 (1970); Potlatch No. I Fed. Credit Union v. Kennedy, 76
Wash. 2d 806, 459 P.2d 32 (1969).
Courts that purport to follow Leflar's choice-influencing considerations approach emphasize the choice-influencing consideration of advancement of the
forum's governmental interests. Leflar defines this consideration with reference to
the forum's "total" governmental interests. See Leflar, More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, note 219 supra. The courts, however, define it with reference
to the forum's interest in applying its own law in order to implement the policy
reflected in that law, as Currie advocates, and apply their own law whenever they
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An excellent example of such skewing is the decision of the California Supreme Court in Bernhard v. Harrah'sClub.279 In that case,
California had an interest in applying its policy of dram shop
liability in favor of a California plaintiff injured in California.
Nevada had an interest in applying its policy of protecting tavern
owners from civil liability in favor of a Nevada tavern owner who
acted in Nevada close enough to the California state line so that it
was foreseeable that his serving of liquor to an intoxicated patron
could cause harm in California. The California court purportedly
applied the principle of comparative impairment to resolve this true
conflict,28 ° and concluded that Nevada's policy would be "comparatively less impaired" if it were required to yield in the particular case. 28 ' Can it seriously be suggested that had the case been
before the Nevada court, it would have agreed with the California
court's conclusion as to "comparative impairment?" If it had, its
behavior would have been very different from that of every other
court faced with the situation where a resident defendant was sought
to be held liable to a non-resident plaintiff under the law of the
plaintiff's home state. In all of these cases the courts of the defendant's home state applied their own law to deny recovery. 282
As the above discussion demonstrates, whenever the forum
sees a real interest in applying its own law, it has a strong motivation to do so. Any purported means of resolving the true conflict, or
indeed any approach to choice of law, is likely to be skewed in
practice to bring about the application of the forum's law. Recognition of this reality supports the straightforward application of the
forum's own law whenever it concludes that it has a real interest in
doing so.
D.

The Unprovided-ForCase
It is the unprovided-for case that has given the courts the most
difficulty in practice 283 and, in Twerski's view, it is in the unprosee a real interest in doing so. See, e.g., Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173
(Ist Cir. 1974); Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp 533 (E.D. Wis. 1968);
Maguire v. Exeter & Hampton Elec. Co., 114 N.H. 589, 325 A.2d 778 (1974).
279. 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859
(1976).
280. 16 Cal. 3d at 320-24, 546 P.2d at 723-26, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219-22.
281. It noted that here the defendant had solicited business in California and
that Nevada imposed criminal liability, although not civil liability, for serving liquor
to intoxicated persons. 16 Cal. 3d at 322, 546 P.2d at 724-25, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
See also Rosenthal v. Warren, 374 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), where the forum,
after holding that it would apply its own law on the issue of charitable immunity
because of its strong interest in allowing recovery to its resident plaintiff who died
while a patient in a Massachusetts hospital, gratuitously noted that Massachusetts'
charitable immunity rule was "regressive" and had since been repealed.
282. See, e.g., Snow v. Continental Prod. Corp., 353 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Wis.
1972); Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Maguire v.
Exeter & Hampton Elec. Co., 114 N.H. 589, 325 A.2d 778 (1974).
283. When confronted with unprovided-for cases, which have been far more
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vided-for case that interest analysis has "gone bankrupt."284 This is
because, says Twerski, interest analysis is based primarily on the
interests of the domicile of the parties in granting or allowing
recovery, and, "when you run out of domiciliaries to protect you
run out of interests." '285 The real difficulty, however, arises not
from the domicile-orientation of interest analysis, but from the fact
that the unprovided-for case cannot be resolved solely with reference to the interests of the involved states because by definition
neither state has an interest in applying its law on the point in issue.

To put it another way, while Currie's interest analysis methodology
can identify the unprovided-for case, it cannot as such provide a

means for its resolution.
numerous than Currie anticipated, the practice of the courts has varied considerably. These cases generally involve automobile accidents where the plaintiff is
from a non-recovery state and the defendant from a recovery state. When the
accident occurs in the defendant's home state, the courts are likely to apply the law
of that state allowing recovery. See Hurtado v. Superior Court, I I Cal. 3d 574, 522
P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974); Frummer v. Hilton Hotels, International, Inc.,
60 Misc. 2d 840, 304 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 1969). Recovery would also be allowed
in this situation under the third Neumeier rule.
When the accident occurs in the plaintiff's home state, however, the results
and reasoning diverge. Some courts have allowed recovery, emphasizing that the
law of the defendant's home state imposed liability. See Decker v. Fox River
Tractor Co., 324 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Johnson v. Hertz, 315 F. Supp.
302 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (which would not be followed today in light of Neumeier); Van
Dyke v. Bolves, 107 N.J. Super. 338, 258 A.2d 372 (App. Div. 1969); cf. Allen v.
Gannaway, 294 Minn. 1, 199 N.W.2d 424 (1972); Bolgrean v. Stich, 293 Minn. 8,
196 N.W.2d 442 (1972) (center of gravity theory utilized). Other courts have denied
recovery, emphasizing that the law of the plaintiff's home state did not provide for
recovery. See Patch v. Stanley Works, 448 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1971); Ryan v. Clark
Equipment Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 679, 74 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1st Dist. 1969); Neumeier
v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 385 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). Ryan was
sharply questioned in Hurtado, 11 Cal. 3d at 586, 522 P.2d at 673-74, 114 Cal. Rptr.
at 113-14, and it is doubtful if its reasoning would be followed today. In Patch a
New Hampshire victim was killed in New Hampshire due to the negligence of a
Connecticut defendant. New Hampshire law limited the amount recoverable for
wrongful death; Connecticut law did not. The Second Circuit, sitting as a Connecticut state court, was required to apply New Hampshire substantive law, since
Connecticut still follows the place of the wrong rule. The plaintiff argued that
Connecticut would look to the "whole law" of New Hampshire, including its
conflicts rules, and in this context, the Second Circuit concluded that New Hampshire would apply its own law on this issue and limit liability. 448 F.2d at 492.
Another approach has been to apply the law of the forum on the ground that
this is the most rational solution to the problem. Such a rationale was advanced for
the application of California law in Hurtado. See also Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or.
454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973). Still another solution has been to look to the common
policies of the involved states to find the means of resolution. See Labree v. Major,
Ill R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973). Since Neumeier is the only clear case denying
recovery, and since recovery has been allowed by most other courts, although the
rationale has differed, I have formulated the rule of choice of law in this situation as
one that allows recovery: When a plaintiff from a non-recovery state is involved in
an accident with a defendant from a recovery state, recovery generally will be
allowed irrespective of where the accident occurred. Sedler, Rules of Choice-ofLaw, supra note 3, at -.
284. Twerski, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 144, at 104.
285. Id. at 108.
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My own view is that the unprovided-for case can be resolved
by looking to the common policy of the involved states.26 While
this view finds its roots in Currie's concern with "non-discrimination," 287 I have developed it along different lines and have tried to
loosen it from any constitutional underpinnings. Usually the point
as to which the laws of the involved states differ will involve a
substantive rule that is an exception to the common policy reflected
in what may be called the general law of both states. Since the state
whose law represents an exception to that common policy has no
interest in having its law applied in the circumstances of the particular case,"' it issubmitted that the common policy should come to
the fore, and the exception should not be recognized.
Typical of such an exception to the common policy of the
involved states is guest statute immunity. All states allow recovery
for negligence, but some make an exception when the victim is a
passenger in the host's automobile by requiring a higher standard of
proof in that situation. The only state interested in allowing that
exception is the defendant's home state and when it does not do so,
the common policy of both states in favor of recovery should
prevail. The same is true of other defenses such as family immunity
and limitations on wrongful death recovery,289 which should not be
recognized when they do not exist under the law of the defendant's
home state. 2" By the same token, protective immunities in the
contract situation, such as incompetency or spendthrift immunity,
represent an exception to the common policy of enforcing contracts,
and likewise should not be recognized if they do not exist under the
law of the defendant's home state.
The common policy rationale does not require going beyond
the policies and interests reflected in the laws of the involved states.
The only interest with which a court applying interest analysis
should be concerned is the interest of a state in applying its law in
order to implement the policy reflected in that law. Just as there is
no difficulty in determining the policy behind a state's rule of
substantive law, there is no difficulty in determining the common
policy reflected in the "general law" of the involved states. And,
286. See Sedler, Interstate Accidents, supra note 56, at 137-42. The common
policy rationale was accepted in Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973).
287. See Sedler, Interstate Accidents, supra note 56, at 143-49 (discussion of
Currie's views as to non-discrimination).
288. See notes 259-71 & accompanying text supra.
289. Professor Weintraub disagrees with the utility of the common policy
rationale in the wrongful death context on the ground that there are significant
variations in the way that different states compute wrongful death damages. Weintraub, A Response to the Critiques of Professors Sedler, Twerski and Walker, 57
IOWA L. REV. 1258, 1259-60 (1972).
290. Compare the discussion of the "altruistic interest" of the defendant's
home state in allowing recovery to any person injured by the defendant in Scoles,
Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. REV. 563, 567-68 (1968), with Ratner,
Choice of Law: Interest Analysis and Cost Contribution, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 817,
832-37 (1974).
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ultimately, there is no difficulty in making the choice of law

decision: When a defendant from a liability state asserts a defense
representing an exception to the common" policy of both states in
imposing liability, the defense should not be recognized because the
only state interested in providing an exception to the common policy
of both of the involved states does not do so.
The common policy rationale, it is submitted, not only provides a proper and sound method for resolving the unprovided-for
case that is fully consistent with the underlying premises of interest

analysis, but its adoption by the courts would clear up the confusion
that now exists with regard to resolution of the unprovided-for
case. 291
E. Some Other Aspects of Interest Analysis
In the context of this reformulation of Currie's governmental
interest approach, it seems appropriate to discuss some other aspects of interest analysis that bear strongly on determining real
interests. Specifically, the -time at which the interests of the involved states should be determined will be discussed as will the
matter of "combining" the laws of the different states in a manner
that achieves a result which would not be possible if the law of
either state were applied in its entirety.
1.

The Time for Determining Interests
The issue of the time at which the interests of the involved
states should be determined arises primarily when there are posttransaction changes in residence. 292 As a result of such changes, the
interests of the originally involved states may be altered from what
they were at the time of the transaction, and the state of a party's
new residence may now have an interest in applying its law on the
point in issue. 293 For example, if the plaintiff or the beneficiaries of
a deceased accident victim changed residences, governmental concern for the welfare of the accident victim and of the beneficiaries
291. Note that in practice, however, despite the differing rationales, most
courts have allowed recovery. See note 283 supra.
292. By "post-transaction," I am referring to changes that occurred after the
claim arose. Where a change of residence occurs after a contract has been entered
into, but before the loss is suffered, there is no question but that interests should be
determined as they exist at the time of the loss. See Clay v. Sun Life Ins. Office,
Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
293. As a practical matter, the change in interests in the accident situation will
generally result only from the plaintiff's change of residence. If the defendant
changes residence, the accident will be charged to the loss experience of the state of
his or her former residence, since loss experience looks to the state where the
vehicle was insured at the time the accident occurred. This is why I do not consider
the post-accident change of residence significant in Miller v. Miller. See note 269
supra. The same is true of the post-accident change of residence in Dorion v.
Dorion, 109 N.H. I, 241 A.2d 372 (1968), where after the accident the spouses
moved from a state that did not recognize spousal immunity to a state that did.
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would correspondingly shift to the state of their new residence.
Likewise, where an insured's beneficiary changes residence after
the insured's death, the state of the new residence is the state
interested in whether recovery will be allowed on the insurance
policy. These illustrative situations will be used to discuss the
significance of post-transaction changes of residence and the problem of the time at which interests should be determined.
Some courts have been unwilling to consider post-transaction
changes in residence and have determined the interests of the
2 94
involved states as they existed at the time of the transaction.
Others, however, have looked to the interests in light of posttransaction changes. 295 The failure to consider post-accident
changes of residence does not matter in some cases,296 but it could
make a very marked difference in a case such as Gore v. Northeast
Airlines .297 In Gore, the plaintiff moved after the accident from the
recovery state where the action was brought to a non-recovery state.
The defendant resided throughout in a non-recovery state. In terms
of the interests of the states where the parties reside, the change of
residence converted the case from one where the forum has a real
interest in applying its law to a case where the forum does not have
a real interest in applying its law, but another state does. Conversely, if the plaintiff had moved from a non-recovery to a recovery
state, the recovery state would then have had a real interest in
applying its law in favor of its new residents, since the consequences of allowing or not allowing recovery would be felt in that
state.
In Gore, the forum refused to take the post-accident change of
residence into account, and applied its own law allowing recovery.
The court said that looking to interests as they existed at the time of
the accident would prevent "forum shopping." Although this reasoning would not apply to Gore since the new domicile provided a
lesser recovery, 298 Professor Weintraub maintains that the result in
294. See Tiernan v. Westext Transport, Inc., Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967); 295 F. Supp. 1256 (D.R.I. 1969); Reich v. Purcell, 67
Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Dorion v. Dorion, 109 N.H. 1,241
A.2d 372 (1968).

295. In addition to Miller, where the change did not affect the interest mix, the
court did so in Kjeldsen v. Ballard, 52 Misc. 2d 952, 277 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Sup. Ct.
1967), and Manning v. Hyland, 42 Misc. 2d 915, 249 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1964).

In these two cases, the accident victim subsequently married the defendant and
moved to the defendant's home state, which recognized spousal immunity. The
courts applied the law of the new domicile and barred the suit.
296. See Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31
(1967), where the beneficiaries moved from one recovery state to another, and
which presented a false conflict in any event, since the defendant was also from a
recovery state.
297. 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967).

298.

See

WEINTRAUB,

supra note 219, at 250.
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that case was correct: The widow should not be discouraged from
making a move "otherwise in the best interests of herself and the
children" for fear of "reducing compensation for the defendants by
many hundreds of thousands of dollars."- 299 In the converse situation, however, where the victim or beneficiaries move from a nonrecovery to a recovery state, Professor Weintraub suggests that it
might be proper to look to the law of the new domicile, at least
where it is unlikely that the move
was made "in order to influence
' 3°°
the choice of applicable law.
Professor Seidelson, on the other hand, argues that the change
of domicile should be taken into account in both situations: The
change of domicile does significantly affect the interests of the
involved states, and to ignore this would "constitute a perversion of
interest analysis." As he states, "It would impose upon a court,
purporting to resolve a choice of law problem by rational consideration of the legitimate interests of the states involved, a nonfact: that the widow is domiciled in one state when in law and in fact
she is domiciled in another. That kind of indulgence in fiction is
contrary to the very essence of interest analysis.' '30 In Gore, he

would apply the law of the beneficiaries' new domicile to limit the
amount of recovery.3 2 When the victim or the beneficiaries moved
from a non-recovery to a recovery state, Seidelson would, without
qualification, advocate application of its own law by the state of the
new domicile. Such recovery would not be unfair to the defendant,
since the defendant could not reasonably have anticipated "unchanged domiciles."303

As the above discussion indicates, the interest and fairness test
justifies consideration of post-transaction changes of residence in
the accident situation because (1) only the new domicile has any
interest in allowing tort recovery for the victim or the beneficiaries,
and (2) application of the law of that state is not unfair, either to the
victim or the beneficiaries in the event that the move is to a nonrecovery state, or to the defendant or the insurer in the event that the
move is to a recovery state. 304
299. Id.
300. Id. at 251-52.
301. Seidelson, Interest Analysis and an Enhanced Degree of Specificity: The
Wrongful Death Action, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 525, 531 (1972).

302. Id. at 533-35. Once the change of domicile is recognized, there is no
conflict of laws, since both the law of the plaintiff's home state and the law of the
defendant's home state limit recovery.
303. Id. at 537. It may also be noted that the point in issue, i.e., the amount
recoverable for wrongful death, does not involve reliance on the law of a particular
state. See also Note, Post Transaction or Occurrence Events in the Conflict-ofLaws, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 843, 850 (1969) [hereinafter cited as OccurrenceEvents].

304. An illustration of taking post-accident change of residence into account is
Kieldsen v. Ballard, 52 Misc. 2d 952, 227 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Sup. Ct. 1967). At the time
of the accident, which occurred in New Jersey, the plaintiff was a resident of New
York, which did not recognize spousal immunity, and the defendant, her fiance,
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Assuming the correctness of this reasoning, if post-accident
changes of residence are not to be considered it must be because of
factors other than those relating to the policies and interests of the
involved states. Such a factor arises when the victim or the beneficiaries have moved from a recovery to a non-recovery state. It is
socially undesirable, as Professor Weintraub points out, to discourage moves which may be in the best interests of the survivors; in
fact, to do so would be inconsistent with the national policy encouraging movement from one state to another that is reflected in
the constitutional right to travel.30 5 For this reason, the post-accident change of residence should not be taken into account when the
victim or the survivors move from a recovery to a non-recovery
state. However, when the movement is from a non-recovery to a
recovery state, the new domicile should apply its law because it now
has a real interest in doing so, and because the application of its law
is not unfair to the defendant or insurer, who did not "rely" on the
law of the victim or beneficiaries' former domicile in any way
whatsoever.
When a change of residence occurs in a contract situation, the
matter of fairness in looking to the law of the newly interested state
is presented much more strikingly, and is the framework within
which the question should be approached. The court should look to
the interest of the state of the new residence, unless this would be
unfair to the other contracting party. In Clay v. Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd.3° 6 for example, the change in residence occurred after
the contract was entered into but before the loss was suffered. Thus,
no unfairness resulted from application of the law of the insured's
new domicile to hold invalid a "built-in" statute of limitations
provision in the insurance contract which was valid under the law of
the insured's former domicle. The insurance contract was of the
"floater" variety, covering the property wherever it was situated,
so the insurer could anticipate that it would be taken into another
state. 307
was a resident of Virginia, which did. The parties subsequently married, and the
plaintiff changed her domicile to Virginia. Under Virginia law spousal immunity
extended to antenuptial torts. Emphasizing the lack of any present New York
interest in the question, the New York court held that Virginia law applied on the
issue of spousal immunity. To the same effect is Manning v. Hyland, 42 Misc. 2d
915, 249 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
305. It is not suggested, however, that the application of the law of the new
domicile to deny recovery would.be unconstitutional. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393 (1975) (holding one year residency requirement for divorce not violative of
constitutional right to travel).
306. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
307. Cf. Quarty v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 244 So. 2d 181 (Fla.
App. 1971), in which the court held that the statute involved in Clay did not apply
when the insured changed his domicile to Florida after the loss occurred.
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Now suppose that after the death of the insured on a life
insurance contract, the family moved to another state in which suit
for recovery on the policy is brought. The insurer defends on the
basis of a provision in the insurance contract that is valid under the
law of the former domicile, but invalid under the law of the new
domicile. In this situation, the new domicile clearly has a real
interest in applying its law to determine the validity of the provision
because of the consequences that denial of recovery may have on
the insured's family, who are now its concern. This was the situation presented in John Hancock Mutual Insurance Co. v. Yates. 308
The contract was entered into in New York, where the insured
resided until his death. Under New York law a false representation
as to prior medical care enables the insurer to avoid liability on the
contract. Suit was brought in Georgia, where the beneficiaries
moved after the insured's death. The Georgia court, while conceding that New York substantive law applied, 3°9 held that as a matter
of "procedure", it was for the jury to decide whether the false
representation was "material". The jury found that it was not. The
Supreme Court quite properly found a denial of full faith and credit
to New York law, which admittedly was "substantively applicable," since the so-called "procedural" determination would alter
the substantive nature of the claim.
It may be asked whether the same result would have been
obtained if Georgia had applied its own substantive law on the
ground that it now had a real interest in determining the question of
the insurer's liability on the contract. One commentator has suggested that effect cannot be given to a "post-occurrence change in
law" 3 1 if the conduct of one of the litigants "would have been
different if the present rule had been known and the change foreseen. " 3 1' Applying this principle to the situation in Yates, it would
seem that the application of Georgia law to determine the particular
question that was in issue would have been unfair.31 2 In reliance on
308.

299 U.S. 178 (1936).

309.
310.
311.
312.

On the ground that it was the place where the contract was made.
This refers to a change of residence after the accident or loss occurred.
Occurrence Events, supra note 303, at 855.
And, it is submitted, unconstitutional under the interest and fairness test

set forth in Clay. Currie dealt with this situation by drawing an analogy to retroactive application of statutes for domestic purposes: If a state could not properly

apply its legislation retroactively to prior transactions, it could not, in the choice of
law context, apply its own law in the choice of law context. The Verdict of
Quiescent Years, in CURRIE, supra note 1, 621 (article originally published at 28 U.
CHI. L. REV. 258 (1961)); Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, in CURRIE,
supra note 1, at 736-39 (article originally published at 1963 DUKE L.J. 1); Currie,
Full Faith and Credit, supra note 1, at 98-99. See also the discussion of Yates in
CURRIE, supra note 1, 235-36. These situations differ, however. See Hill, supra
note 8, at 494-%; Traynor, supra note 42, at 867-73, and Currie's analysis of this
situation appears very questionable.
But unfairness results only because the change of residence occurred after the
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New York law, the insurer would assume that it did not have to be
concerned about the accuracy of the information contained in the
insured's application until the insured died and a claim was made by
the beneficiaries. At that time it could assert the provisions of New
York law absolutely voiding the contract because of false representations as to prior medical care, whether material or not. If a
different standard were to be applied, the insurer presumably would
have taken steps to cancel the policy at an earlier time when proof of
materiality was more likely to have been available.
Suppose, 'however, that the particular question in issue was the
validity of a suicide provision contained in the insurance contract
and that at all times the insured was domiciled in State A, under
whose law the insurer was not liable in the event of suicide. After
the insured committed suicide, the beneficiaries moved to State B,
under whose law suicide does not relieve the insurer of the obligation to pay unless it occurred within one year after the issuance of
the policy, which was not the case here. In this situation the
application of State B law on the issue of the validity of the suicide
provision would not be unfair to the insurer. With regard to the
suicide provision, regardless of which state's law applied to determine its validity, the insurer's conduct would not "have been
different if the present rule had been known and the change foreseen."" 3 Since State B now has a real interest in applying its law
on the point in issue, and since the application of its law on this
point is not unfair to the insurer, it should apply its own law.3 14
In summary, the interests of the involved states should generally be determined as they exist at the time the case is presented to the
court, and when subsequent changes in residence produce a mix of
interests different from those existing at the time of the transaction,
insured had died. Cf. Occurrence Events, supra note 303, at 854, where it is
argued that in Yates, "lilt might be thought unfair for an insurance company not to
know the extent of its liability for its agent's actions and thus the amount of
supervision required."
313. See text accompanying note 311 supra.
314. In Berkrant. v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266
(1961), the court indicated that if the decedent were a Nevada domiciliary at the
time the contract was entered into, California could not apply its statute of frauds
pertaining to wills in the event that the insured changed his domicile to California
prior to his death. 55 Cal. 2d at 594-95, 360 P.2d at 909, 12 Cal. Rptr. 269. See
Horowitz, supra note 44, at 772-74. Currie also maintains that the new domicile
should not and probably constitutionally could not apply its law in this situation.
Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict-of-Laws: Privileges and Immunities, in CURRIE, supra note 1, at 457-59 (article originally published at 69 YALE
L.J. 1323 (1960)). Here I would disagree. As in Clay, the other party was not
entitled to expect that the promisor would not effect a change of domicile, and since
the contract would not be enforceable until the promisor died, that party took the
risk that the promisor would die domiciled in a state that did not enforce such
contracts. There is certainly no unfairness in applying the law of the decedent's
domicile at the time of death to determine the validity of a contract to will executed
during the decedent's lifetime even if the decedent was domiciled elsewhere at the
time of execution.
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the new interests should be the ones considered by the court.
Exceptions should be made only where this general rule would
produce unfairness, or where other considerations, such as the
national policy of encouraging movement from one state to another,
militate against taking post-transaction changes of residence and
resulting changes of interest into account.
2.

Combining the Laws of the Different States
This aspect of interest analysis involves the possibility of
applying the laws of different states to different issues in a case in a
manner that achieves a result that would not be possible if the law of
either state were applied in its entirety. The possibility of combining
laws is illustrated by a case posited by Professor Cavers, in which a
New York plaintiff is injured on a trip in Massachusetts sponsored
by a New York charity. After its New York registered vehicle
breaks down, the charity rents a vehicle in Massachusetts, which is
not registered as required by Massachusetts law. The injury results
from an accident involving this vehicle. The driver of the vehicle
would not be considered guilty of negligence under either New
York or Massachusetts law. Under Massachusetts law, however,
the operator of an unregistered vehicle would be strictly liable for all
harm resulting from the operation of the vehicle. Massachusetts
recognizes charitable immunity; New York does not.31 5 If New
York law applies on the issues of liability and immunity, the
defendant will prevail because its conduct would not be actionable.
If Massachusetts law applies in its entirety, the defendant would
prevail on grounds of charitable immunity.
Assume that the plaintiff brings suit in Massachusetts. Only
New York has a real interest in applying its law on the issue of
charitable immunity, since the charity is a New York charity carrying on its good works for residents of that state. On the issue of
substantive liability, however, both states have a real interest. New
York is interested in applying its rule in order to protect a New York
defendant from what it considers to be unwarranted liability. But
Massachusetts is equally interested in applying its strict liability rule
in order to implement the admonitory policy reflected in that rule,
since the conduct that it desired to prevent--driving an unregistered
vehicle-occurred in Massachusetts. Only if the Massachusetts
court determines its real interests separately with respect to liability
and immunity can it achieve a sound result. Because Massachusetts
does not have a real interest in applying its charitable immunity law,
it should apply New York law on that issue. The forum's rule of
substantive liability should be applied, on the other hand, because
Massachusetts does have a real interest in applying its law on that
315. This is the "imaginary case" posited in CAVERS, supra note 136, at 34-43.
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issue. The combination of New York and Massachusetts law produces no unfairness to the defendant. The charity, a New York
corporation, was subject to New York's law on charitable immunity, and thus was insured for tort liability. Similarly, it acted in
Massachusetts, so as to bring itself within the scope of Massachusetts' admonitory policy. In effect, the defendant can be
charged with foreseeing the possibility of this combination of laws,
resulting in the imposition of liability here.31 6
It is now generally recognized that choice of law is a choice
between the differing laws of the involved states rather than a
choice between states. 317 This important distinction comes out most
clearly when the choice of law decision is made with reference to
the policies and interests of the involved states. That different states
have real interests in applying their law to different issues in a case
justifies combining laws to reach a result that would not be possible
if one state's law were applied in its entirety.
CONCLUSION

The governmental interest approach to choice of law formulated by the late Brainerd Currie has, indeed, been the catalyst of
the modern revolution in conflicts law in this country. It is the
approach that in practice has found the greatest favor with courts
committed to a policy-centered view of choice of law. Most important, the approach has produced sound and fair results.
This re-analysis and reformulation of Currie's approach
springs not only from my belief in the superiority of interest analysis,318 but also from my desire that the future development of choice
of law in this country will proceed within the framework Currie
pioneered. It is my hope that I have made some contribution to that
development with this Article.
316. If suit had been brought in New York, New York should apply its law on
both issues and hold that the charity is not substantively liable.
317.
318.

See CAVERS, supra note 136, at 122-42.
As David Currie has observed: "Interest analysis, like other methods of

approaching choice of law, is not perfect. But it has the virtue of recognizing that
laws are adopted in order to accomplish social goals and that they should be applied
as to carry out their purposes." Currie, Comments on Reich v. Purrell, supra note
274, at 605.

